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Benefit corporations—corporations organized for the express 
purpose of realizing both financial wealth for shareholders and articulated 
social or environmental benefits1—have taken the United States by storm. 
With Maryland passing the first benefit corporation statute in 2010,2 
legislative growth of the form has been rapid. Currently, thirty states and 
the District of Columbia have passed benefit corporation statutes, and 
seven additional states have legislation pending.3 
The proliferation of benefit corporation statutes and B Corp 
certifications (a seal of approval, of sorts)4 can largely be attributed to the 
active promotional work of B Lab Company (B Lab), a nonprofit 
corporation organized in 2006 under Pennsylvania law that supports social 
enterprise and business mission alignment writ large.5 B Lab works with 
individuals and interest groups to generate attention to social enterprise 
and mission alignment in two key ways. First, it focuses its operations on 
creating a movement around firms that “meet the highest standards of 
                                                     
 1. See, e.g., J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and 
Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2012) (summarizing the benefit 
corporation form); Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of 
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 593–606 (2011) (describing the benefit corporation 
form in detail). Under most state statutes, a benefit corporation must articulate both social and 
environmental benefits. 
 2. See B Lab, Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation, CSRWIRE 
(Apr. 14, 2010, 10:57 AM), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/29332-Maryland-First-State-in-
Union-to-Pass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation [http://perma.cc/3V8X-3MCD]; Debra Cassens 
Weiss, Md. Adopts Nation’s First Law Creating Do-Gooder ‘Benefit Corporations’, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 
15, 2010, 4:06 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/md._adopts_nations_first_law_ 
creating_do-gooder_benefit_corporations/ [http://perma.cc/68KD-TFZ7]. 
 3. See B Lab, State by State Status of Legislation, http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-
state-status [http://perma.cc/669E-P6BX]. 
 4. See What are B Corps?, BCORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps  
[http://perma.cc/AUN6-YHD3] (“B Corp is to business what Fair Trade certification is to coffee or 
USDA Organic certification is to milk.”). 
 5. See J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 575–78 
(2016). See generally About B Lab, BCORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-
corps/about-b-lab (offering information about, among other things, B Lab’s history, funding, 
governance, and operations). A quick search of the Pennsylvania Department of State’s online 
database, https://www.corporations.pa.gov/search/corpsearch, confirms the corporate status of B Lab. 
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verified, overall social and environmental performance, public 
transparency, and legal accountability” and “align the interests of business 
with those of society and to help high impact businesses be built to last.”6 
Second, B Lab engenders awareness of and support for the benefit 
corporation form and B Corp certification. B Lab also supplies model 
benefit corporation legislation, social enterprise standards that may meet 
the requirements of benefit corporation statutes in various states, and other 
services to social enterprises. 
Professor Haskell Murray reports that, as compared to other states, 
Nevada and Delaware, leaders in the benefit corporation incorporation 
race, have already registered relatively large numbers of benefit 
corporation incorporations (Nevada with 1,130 and Delaware with 368).7 
The larger number of benefit corporation incorporations in these two states 
is somewhat predictable given the history of and efforts encouraging 
incorporations in both states. Also, Delaware decisional law is arguably 
particularly unfriendly to for-profit corporate boards that fail to place 
shareholder financial wealth maximization first in every decision they 
make.8 
However, outside of Nevada and Delaware, benefit corporation 
statutes have not, by and large, been the entity law version of a “field of 
dreams” that some imagined or may have promised.9 Statutes have been 
enacted, but social enterprise firms have not gravitated to them in large 
numbers. In other words, despite the legislative popularity of the form, 
there have not been as many benefit corporation incorporations as one 
might expect. In the first four years of benefit corporation authority, for 
example, Maryland reported fewer than forty benefit corporations.10 
Tennessee’s benefit corporation statute came into effect in January 2016, 
and as of May 2, 2016, Secretary of State filings evidence the organization 
of twenty-six for-profit benefit corporations.11 Although this figure may 
                                                     
 6. See About B Lab, supra note 5. 
 7. See Murray, supra note 5, at 588 (app. A). The number of Nevada benefit corporations may 
over-count the number of actual benefit corporations, however. See infra note 15 and accompanying 
text. 
 8. The Delaware Court of Chancery opinion in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 
A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2010), is widely cited as a reason and catalyst for benefit corporation statutes. 
See infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 9. The reference is to the popular 1989 Universal City Studios fantasy film, Field of Dreams, 
starring Kevin Costner famous for the line, “If you build it, he will come.” See FIELD OF DREAMS 
(Gordon Company 1989). 
 10. Benefit Corporations and Benefit LLCs formed in Maryland as of August 20, 2014,  
MD. ST. DEP’T OF ASSESSMENTS & TAX’N, http://dat.maryland.gov/businesses/Documents/ 
Benefitcorpllc.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL38-KB6A]. 
 11. Tennessee for-profit benefit corporation charter information included in this Article comes 
from charters obtained in response to a public records request filed with the Business Services Division 
of the Office of the Tennessee Secretary of State. These charters are on file with the author. Record 
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seem impressive, a review of these Tennessee filings suggests that well 
more than half were erroneously organized as benefit corporations.12 
Colorado, another recent adopter of the benefit corporation, does appear 
to have a large number of filings (ninety in total as of June 12, 2016, based 
on the list of Colorado benefit corporations on the B Lab website).13 
However, as with Tennessee, a number of these listed corporations appear 
to be erroneously classified.14 Professor Murray, Professor Eric Franklin, 
and others have raised similar concerns about the descriptive power of the 
Nevada data on benefit corporation filings.15 These anecdotal offerings 
indicate that published lists of benefit corporations—even those 
constructed from state filing data—may over-count the number of 
qualified benefit corporations, perhaps significantly. 
                                                     
keeping differences among states with authorized benefit corporations make accurate, comprehensive 
data difficult to obtain. Although many states have online databases for corporations and other state-
chartered business entities, those databases may or may not be searchable in a manner that allows for 
the easy or accurate identification of benefit corporations. Yet, public records requests, like the one 
made in Tennessee, may enable researchers to secure the information they seek. Although B Lab 
includes a list of “benefit corporations” on its website, the list includes LLCs and is preceded by an 
explanation/disclaimer: 
The list below is B Lab’s best effort to create an accurate accounting of benefit corps and 
is inclusive of all data collated by B Lab from state agency reports. Many states do not 
currently track the names or number of benefit corporations. B Lab continuously collects 
this data, however each state has [sic] different level of reporting capabilities. 
B Lab, Find a Benefit Corp., http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/find-a-benefit-corp. 
 12. Among other things, the filings include corporate purposes like: “SERVICE AUTO 
GLASS,” “TRUCKING,” “Buy, sell, rent, and /or lease commercial and residential property,” “retail,” 
and the like. 
 13. B Lab, Find a Benefit Corporation, http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/find-a-benefit-
corp?field_bcorp_certified_value=&state=Colorado&title=&op=Go&sort_by=field_bcorp_state_val
ue&sort_order=ASC [http://perma.cc/5M9B-A2HY]. 
 14. For example, the Colorado Secretary of State filing history of DDD Land Surveying Inc. 
(listed as a benefit corporation on the B Lab website), History and Documents, COLO. SECRETARY OF 
ST. http://www.sos.state.co.us/biz/BusinessEntityHistory.do?quitButtonDestination=BusinessEntity 
Detail&pi1=1&nameTyp=ENT&entityId2=20121295013&srchTyp=ENTITY&masterFileId=20121
295013 [https://perma.cc/4PXL-SG5P], indicates that the corporation’s articles of incorporation were 
amended to add public benefit corporation status and then later amended to remove it. The Colorado 
Secretary of State filing history for another B Lab listed benefit corporation, Rizuto’s Cotton Candy, 
Inc., lists its corporate purpose as “Food Service Cotton Candy,” calling into question its status as a 
benefit corporation. 
 15. See Kate Cooney et al., Benefit Corporation and L3C Adoption: A Survey, STAN. SOC. 
INNOVATION REV., Dec. 5, 2014, http://ssir.org/articles/entry/benefit_corporation_ 
and_l3c_adoption_a_survey; Eric Franklin, Nudging Entrepreneurs into Noncompliance: Why does 
Nevada have so many Benefit Corporations?, UNLV L. BLOG (Sept. 23, 2016), 
http://unlvlawblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/nudging-entrepreneurs-into.html [http://perma.cc/5EMQ-
6UUF]; Murray, supra note 5, at 581 (observing that Nevada’s reported number of benefit corporation 
filings “may have been boosted by the inclusion of a benefit corporation check box on the state form, 
which incorporators may or may not have fully understood”). 
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Research for this Article identified no publicly held U.S. benefit 
corporations.16 For these purposes (and as referenced throughout this 
Article), the term “publicly held” in reference to a corporation is defined 
to mean a corporation (a) with a class of equity securities registered under 
§ 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (1934 Act);17 or 
(b) otherwise required to file periodic reports with the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) under § 13 of the 1934 Act.18 Yet, Laureate 
Education, Inc., which converted to a Delaware benefit corporation in the 
fall of 2015, has filed a Form S-1 for its initial public offering.19 Moreover, 
benefit corporations may be subsidiaries of publicly held corporations (as 
Ben & Jerry’s Homemade Inc., New Chapter Inc., and Plum, PBC have 
demonstrated20), and corporations certified as B Corps have begun to enter 
the ranks of publicly held corporations (perhaps Etsy, Inc. being the most 
                                                     
 16. As this article was going to press, Laureate Education, Inc. announced the closing of its initial 
public offering, making it the first publicly traded benefit corporation.  See Press Release, Laureate 
Education Announces Closing of its Initial Public Offering (Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.laure-
ate.net/NewsRoom/PressReleases/2017/02/Laureate-Education-Announces-Closing-of-its-Initial-
Public-Offering [https://perma.cc/6P73-QXHZ] [hereinafter Laureate Education Press Release]; see 
also Haskell Murray, First Standalone Publicly Traded Benefit Corporation - Laureate Education, 
BUS. L. PROF BLOG (Feb. 10, 2017), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2017/02/first-
standalone-publicly-traded-benefit-corporation-laureate-education-.html [https://perma.cc/LA8P-
E6B4].  Thus, the prediction made at the end of this paragraph has now become a reality.  Due to 
publication deadlines, this Article does not fully reflect the completion of the Laureate Education  
offering. 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2012). 
 18. Id. § 78m. 
 19. See Alex Barinka, Laureate Education Plans IPO as a Public Benefit Company, BLOOMBERG 
(Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-02/kkr-backed-laureate-education-
files-for-initial-public-offering [http://perma.cc/RBM4-RVL6]; Brad Edmondson, The First Benefit 
Corporation IPO Is Coming, And That’s A Big Deal, TRIPLEPUNDIT (Feb. 4, 2016), 
http://www.triplepundit.com/2016/02/first-benefit-corporation-ipo-coming-thats-big-deal/# 
[http://perma.cc/RX29-5XP6]; Chris Lange, Laureate Education Updates Finances in Most Recent 
IPO Filing, 24/7 WALL ST. J. (May 23, 2016), http://247wallst.com/services/2016/05/23/laureate-
education-updates-finances-in-most-recent-ipo-filing/ [http://perma.cc/EQ9T-6UB7]. On the eve of 
publication of this Article, Laureate Education’s initial public offering proceeded to closing.  
Specifically, the registration statement was declared effective on January 31, 2017, and the offering 
closed on February 6, 2017.  See Laureate Education Press Release, supra note 16. 
 20. See Shelley Alpern, When B Corp Met Wall Street, CLEAN YIELD (Mar. 18, 2015), 
http://www.cleanyield.com/when-b-corp-met-wall-street/ [http://perma.cc/BQ9M-TY22]; Aman 
Singh, Campbell Becomes America’s First Public Company to Acquire a Public Benefit Corporation: 
In Conversation with Plum Organics’ Cofounder, CSRWIRE (Sept. 9, 2013, 8:41 AM), 
http://www.csrwire.com/blog/posts/1005-campbell-becomes-america-s-first-public-company-to-
acquire-a-public-benefit-corporation-in-conversation-with-plum-organics-cofounder 
[http://perma.cc/49DR-BCQE]; Anthony Tagliente, Better Know a Deal: A First for Benefit 
Corporations, TRIPLEPUNDIT (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.triplepundit.com/2015/08/better-know-
deal-first-benefit-corporations/# [http://perma.cc/LCG2-8375]. 
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well-known to date21). It likely is only a matter of time before we will see 
the advent of publicly held U.S. benefit corporations. 
With the likely prospect of publicly held U.S. benefit corporations in 
mind, this Article engages in a thought experiment. Specifically, the 
Article views the publicly held U.S. benefit corporation from the 
perspective of litigation risk. It first situates, in Part I, the U.S. benefit 
corporation in its structural and governance context as an incorporated 
business association. Corporate purpose and the attendant managerial 
authority, responsibilities, and fiduciary duties are the key points of 
reference. Then, in Part II, the Article seeks to identify and describe the 
salient, unique litigation risks that may be associated with publicly held 
corporations with the structural and governance attributes of a benefit 
corporation. These include both state litigation under the ultra vires 
doctrine and similarly situated statutory causes of action, as well as actions 
for breach of a corporate law fiduciary duty, and federal law causes of 
action for securities fraud and misstatements. The reflections in Part III 
draw conclusions from the synthesis of the observations made in Parts I 
and II. Specifically, Part III links the importance of a publicly held benefit 
corporation’s public benefit purpose to litigation risk management from 
several perspectives. The commentary in Part III is intended to be of use 
to government officials, policymakers, legal advisors of corporations, 
benefit corporation management, and academic observers, among others.  
I. WHAT MAKES A BENEFIT CORPORATION DIFFERENT? 
In the United States, a benefit corporation is a type of for-profit 
corporation organized under specially tailored provisions included in a 
state’s corporate law.22 Benefit corporations are designed to facilitate the 
use of the corporate form to conduct social enterprise—business that seeks 
to benefit society or the environment as well as shareholders—or 
                                                     
 21. See Hiroko Tabuchi, Etsy I.P.O. Tests Pledge to Balance Social Mission and Profit, N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOk (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/business/dealbook 
/etsy-ipo-tests-pledge-to-emphasize-social-mission-over-profit.html?_r=0. Other publicly held B 
Corps include or have included Brazil’s Natura Cosmeticos S.A. and Rally Software Development 
Corp. (acquired by CA Technologies—CA, Inc.—in 2015). See Ariel Schwartz, A Public Company 
Has Finally Become A B Corp, FASTCO.EXIST (Dec. 23, 2014, 8:18 AM), http://www.fast 
coexist.com/3040158/a-public-company-has-finally-become-a-b-corp [http://perma.cc/CW97-
9KQK]. 
 22. See Brett McDonnell, Benefit Corporations and Strategic Action Fields or (the Existential 
Failing of Delaware), 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 263, 280 (2016) (“State statutes legally define benefit 
corporations. These statutes sit atop the basic business corporation statute. That is, benefit corporations 
are business corporations, subject to all of the rules of the business corporation statute, except insofar 
as the benefit corporation statute provides different or additional rules. The statutes add just a few new 
rules.”). 
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otherwise engage in mission alignment.23 Specifically, benefit corporation 
legislation was introduced in response to concerns that directors and 
officers of social enterprises organized as corporations may be held liable 
in court actions challenging their compliance with applicable fiduciary 
duties.24 
As a result, primary areas of focus in the substantive legal doctrine 
include: (1) provisions on corporate purpose (defining the category and 
scope of the corporation’s operating objectives, including principally the 
benefit corporation’s public benefit25); (2) management authority; and (3) 
fiduciary duties.26 Each of these features of benefit corporation law plays 
                                                     
 23. See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 22, at 264 (“Benefit corporations . . . are meant as a vehicle 
for entrepreneurs and investors who want to be involved in social enterprises, that is, businesses 
seeking both a healthy financial return for their investors while also committing to other socially 
valuable goals.” (footnote omitted)); J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s 
Public Benefit Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 348 (2014) (“The benefit corporation 
statute is the most widely adopted social enterprise statute.” (footnote omitted)). 
 24. The heart of the concern is that a court will find that board members or officers have breached 
an applicable fiduciary duty by taking an action that the board determines to be in the best interest of 
the corporation but fails to maximize financial benefits to shareholders. Two court opinions—Dodge 
v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), an “old chestnut” decided in the closely held corporate context 
under Michigan law, and the more recent Delaware law opinion in Ebay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. 
Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2010)—are typically used to support the argument that corporate 
management should fear this result. See Murray, supra note 1, at 13–17. Because social enterprises, 
by their nature, exist to serve constituencies beyond shareholders and objectives beyond profit and 
wealth maximization, promoters, directors, and officers of social enterprise firms may be especially 
uneasy about the broad-based adoption of a rule requiring management to always act to maximize 
financial benefits to shareholders in order to comply with applicable fiduciary duties. 
 25. In this Article, I generally use the term “corporate purpose” to narrowly refer to the purpose 
of an individual corporation as stated in its corporate charter. Other corporate governance scholars and 
commentators often use the term “corporate purpose” more broadly—in referring to the overall 
purpose of the corporate form and in particular, the policy rational for its statutory existence and the 
constituencies it is intended to serve and benefit. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate 
Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 276–78 (2013) (using 
“corporate purpose” in this broader sense). 
 26. Many commentators also point out the benefit corporation report as a core distinctive 
component. See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 22, at 280; J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit 
Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 25, 30–33 (2015) [hereinafter Murray, Early Report]; Alicia E. 
Plerhoples, Social Enterprise As Commitment: A Roadmap, 48 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 89, 104–105 
(2015); Reiser, supra note 1, at 604; see also J. Haskell Murray, Understanding and Improving Benefit 
Corporation Reporting, BUS. L. TODAY, July 2016, at 1 [hereinafter Murray, Understanding and 
Improving]. However, not every state requires that a benefit report be filed, there is no remedy for 
noncompliance, and many benefit corporations are not meeting their reporting requirements. See 
generally Murray, Early Report, supra, at 31, 42–43 (cataloguing these matters). Accordingly, this 
benefit corporation feature apparently does not independently impact litigation risk and this Article 
omits it as a key feature. Of course, there are other distinctive aspects of public benefit corporation 
law that deserve exploration, perhaps in another future article. Among those not well explored in the 
literature to date (with minor exception): supermajority approval requirements for mergers with and 
conversions into other corporations. See, e.g., J. Haskell Murray, Defending Patagonia: Mergers and 
Acquisitions with Benefit Corporations, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 485 (2013) [hereinafter Murray, 
Defending Patagonia] (focusing generally on benefit corporation mergers through a hypothetical case 
study). 
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a distinct yet interconnected role in establishing the structure and 
governance norms of a benefit corporation from a statutory perspective. 
This Part describes the statutory provisions relating to these three doctrinal 
focal points using examples from state benefit corporation statutes. 
Together, these three aspects of benefit corporation doctrine provide a 
foundational depiction of the nature of the benefit corporation as a 
business association. 
A. Corporate Purpose 
Most modern statutory corporate law provisions outside the benefit 
corporation context typically allow a corporation to be organized for any 
lawful purpose.27 Some state corporation law statutes, notably the General 
Corporation Law of the State of Delaware, known informally as the 
Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL),28 require that a 
corporation’s chartering document, typically called a certificate of 
incorporation or articles of incorporation (charter), include a statement of 
corporate purpose.29 Most state corporate statutes, including those 
adopting the scheme established in the Model Business Corporation Act 
(MBCA),30 allow a corporation to rely on the statute for the adoption of an 
all-encompassing corporate purpose and make the inclusion of a charter 
provision on corporate purpose permissive.31 Regardless of the source of 
a corporation’s purpose (statute and charter or statute alone), for-profit 
corporations, including social enterprises organized as corporations, 
usually take advantage of the full breadth of the permitted purposes for 
which a corporation can be organized and operated under the applicable 
state law.32 
Benefit corporation statutes are designed to change that norm. They 
typically provide for mandatory charter provisions requiring certain 
content. Specifically, to be organized as a benefit corporation, a firm must 
                                                     
 27. See Johnson, supra note 25, at 282 (“[A]ll corporate statutes are silent and agnostic on 
purpose, speaking to ‘purpose’ only by way of permitting a corporation to conduct ‘any lawful 
business or purposes.’”) (footnotes omitted); Adam J. Sulkowski & Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, A Prod, 
and A Big Stick: An Evaluation of Class Actions, Shareholder Proposals, and the Ultra Vires Doctrine 
As Methods for Controlling Corporate Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 929, 945–48 (2005) (“While 
the requirement of listing specific corporate purposes and powers was removed from state 
incorporation laws, the requirement that the corporation’s purposes and activities be ‘lawful’ or ‘legal’ 
was never removed.”). 
 28. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101–398 (2016). 
 29. See § 102(a)(3). 
 30. See generally MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1984). 
31. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(2)(i) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1984). 
 32. See Sulkowski & Greenfield, supra note 27, at 947–48 (setting forth examples that illustrate 
this point). Yet, the MBCA and state statutes based on it allow corporations to provide for more 
specific corporate purposes in their chartering documents. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(2)(i) 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1984). 
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expressly set forth in its charter a general or specific public benefit 
purpose—a purpose to benefit society or the environment.33 
These requirements for and definitions of public benefit are variously 
specified from state to state. Appendix 1 provides a chart summarizing the 
requirements for general versus specific public benefit purposes in the 
states adopting benefit corporation statutes. Definitions of general public 
benefit and specific public benefit from the various state statutes are 
included in Appendix 2. 
Most states require that the charter include a general public benefit 
to both society and the environment and permit the charter to include one 
or more specific public benefit purposes.34 The Colorado, Delaware, and 
Tennessee statutes require the statement of at least one public benefit 
purpose.35 Minnesota law provides for two discrete types of benefit 
corporation based on the type of public benefit provided for in the 
charter—a general benefit corporation and a specific benefit corporation.36 
State statutes define general public benefit in a relatively consistent 
manner. These definitions typically provide that general public benefit 
comprises a “material positive impact on society and the environment, 
taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from the business 
and operations of a benefit corporation.”37 Some statutes omit the 
reference to a third-party standard.38 
Statutory definitions of specific public benefit differ more widely, 
although still within a relatively narrow range. The key benefits called out 
in these statutes include: 
 serving low-income or underserved individuals or communities; 
 fostering extraordinary economic opportunity or economic 
development for individuals or communities; 
 protecting, preserving, or restoring the environment; 
 bettering human health; 
 stimulating the arts, sciences, or development of knowledge; 
                                                     
 33. See infra apps. 1 and 2; see infra text accompanying notes 34–41. 
 34. These states include Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, 
Virginia, West Virginia, and Washington, D.C. See infra apps. 1 and 2. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See id. 
 37. States with this specific definition include Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska, 
New York, and Rhode Island. See infra app. 2. 
 38. New Jersey’s and Oregon’s statutes are examples. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 (West 
2016); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.750 (West 2016). See generally infra app. 2 (recording these and 
other general purpose definitions in state benefit corporation statutes). 
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 improving the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit 
purpose; and 
 advancing society or the environment in another identifiable 
manner.39 
 
Several states include broad introductory language contextualizing the 
specified benefits.40 Certain states also tweak the individual expressions 
of the specific benefits listed in the statute.41 
Examples of benefit purposes from actual corporate charters may 
help illustrate the overall import of these various statutory expressions of 
a required benefit purpose. Tennessee for-profit benefit corporation 
SaveMomLife Corporation reports a public benefit purpose “to inspire, 
motivate and uplift mothers of all ages and races through mentoring 
programs and support services geared in the areas of advancing family, 
business and spiritual growth.”42 IFATHOM, INC., another for-profit 
benefit corporation organized under Tennessee law, “intends to 
pursue . . . economic and social capital development among youth 
demographics via entrepreneurial problem-solving, project-based learning 
and community engagement.”43 Beta Bionics, Inc., a Massachusetts 
benefit corporation, has “the purpose of creating a general public benefit, 
with a specific public benefit of improving human health.”44 And the 
articles of incorporation of Jason Wiener, P.C., a Colorado public benefit 
corporation, include a lengthier public benefit purpose: 
(a) to create material, positive general public benefit, including but 
not limited to: (i) providing legal and business consulting services to 
start-up ventures, and mission-centered social and environmental 
enterprises; (ii) promoting democratized ownership structures; and 
(iii) advancing clean and distributed energy; (b) to engage in the 
transaction of all lawful business or pursue any other lawful purpose 
or purposes for which a PBC may be incorporated under Colorado 
                                                     
 39. See generally infra app. 2 (documenting the contents of specific purpose definitions in state 
benefit corporation statutes). 
 40. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-130 (2015) (“‘Specific public benefit purpose’ means a 
benefit that serves one or more public welfare, religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational 
purposes, or other purposes or benefits beyond the strict interest of the shareholders of the benefit 
corporation.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (2015) (“‘Specific public benefit’ means a benefit that 
serves one or more public welfare, religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, 
or other purpose or benefit beyond the strict interest of the shareholders of the benefit corporation.”). 
 41. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3302 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03 (2016). See 
generally infra app. 2. 
 42. Charter, SaveMomLife Corporation, art. 12 (on file with author). 
 43. Articles of Amendment for Restatement Charter, IFATHOM, INC., art. 3 (on file with 
author). 
44. Third Amended and Restated Articles of Organization, Beta Bionics, Inc., art. II, at 
http://corp.sec.state.ma.us/CorpWeb/CorpSearch/CorpSearchViewPDF.aspx. 
2017] Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk  621 
law; and (c) to have, enjoy, and exercise all of the rights, powers, and 
privileges conferred upon PBCs incorporated pursuant to Colorado 
law, whether now or hereafter in effect, and whether or not herein 
specifically mentioned.45  
Many of the benefit purposes set forth in benefit corporation chartering 
documents could easily be pursued by either a for-profit or nonprofit firm. 
Charter-based descriptions of a corporate purpose are always 
important as a frame for a board of directors’ decision-making in any 
corporation. In a benefit corporation, however, corporate purpose is much 
more central as a matter of statutory law than it is in legislative enactments 
governing other for-profit corporations. The importance of a benefit 
corporation’s general or specific public benefit becomes more apparent 
when viewed through the lens of the statutorily defined management 
authority and responsibility and fiduciary duties. 
B. Management Authority and Responsibilities 
For the most part, U.S. benefit corporation legislation adopts the 
management structure of a for-profit corporation organized under the 
general corporate law of the jurisdiction of incorporation without regard 
to the benefit corporation rules. However, a significant number of U.S 
benefit corporation statutes require that an annual benefit report be filed 
and mandate the designation of a “benefit corporation director” (either 
generally or if the firm is a publicly held corporation) or provide for the 
optional designation of a benefit director—a board member who is 
responsible for preparing a compliance opinion for inclusion in the benefit 
report.46 These benefit corporation statutes may exculpate a benefit 
director from personal liability for conduct undertaken in that capacity 
(within express limits).47 In almost all of those jurisdictions requiring an 
annual benefit report filing, the benefit corporation statute provides for an 
                                                     
45. First Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation, Jason Wiener, P.C., art. III, at 
http://www.sos.state.co.us/biz/ViewImage.do?fileId=20141486758&masterFileId=20141023819. 
 46. See infra app. 3 (summarizing information about benefit director and officer provisions in 
the various state benefit corporation statutes). A recent article notes that the rate of compliance with 
benefit report filing requirements has been very low. See Murray, Early Report, supra note 26, at  
34–35 (summarizing a limited test of benefit corporations in four states); see also Murray, 
Understanding and Improving, supra note 26. 
 47. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-410(F) (2016) (“[A] benefit director is not personally 
liable for monetary damages for any act or omission taken in that capacity unless the act or omission 
constitutes a transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit, willful 
misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10(f) (2016) (“[A] benefit 
director shall not be personally liable for any act or omission taken in his or her official capacity as a 
benefit director unless the act or omission is not in good faith, involves intentional misconduct or a 
knowing violation of law, or involves a transaction from which the director directly or indirectly 
derived an improper personal benefit.”). 
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optional “benefit officer” who is responsible for preparing the benefit 
report and exercising powers and duties designated in the bylaws or by 
resolution of the board.48 A chart summarizing the current statutes 
providing for benefit directors and benefit officers is attached as Appendix 
3. Overall, these positions exist to help establish and ensure compliance 
with the corporation’s public benefit. 
U.S. benefit corporation legislation also may include a provision 
tailoring corporate management objectives. For example, Tennessee law 
provides that “[a] for-profit benefit corporation shall be managed in a 
manner that considers the best interests of those materially affected by the 
corporation’s conduct, including the pecuniary interests of shareholders, 
and the public benefit or public benefits identified in its charter.”49 Similar 
provisions exist in other state benefit corporation laws. In most cases, they 
are included in the provision defining the concept of a benefit corporation 
under that state’s law.50 This type of management provision directly 
connects the benefit corporation’s expressed charter-based public benefit 
to the managerial function. 
C. Fiduciary Duties 
Director standards of conduct (and, if provided for under state law, 
officer standards of conduct)51 in the U.S. benefit corporation context 
typically derive from both the general standards of conduct under the 
jurisdiction of incorporation’s for-profit corporation law and the specific 
corporation’s articulated public benefit. Specifically, although state laws 
vary, benefit corporation statutes relating to director fiduciary duties may: 
 incorporate by reference the general standards of conduct from 
the state corporate law; 
                                                     
 48. See infra app. 3 (indicating states with benefit officer provisions). 
 49. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-104(d) (2015). 
 50. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2016). Specifically, the definition provides that: 
A “public benefit corporation” is a for-profit corporation organized under and subject to 
the requirements of this chapter that is intended to produce a public benefit or public 
benefits and to operate in a responsible and sustainable manner. To that end, a public 
benefit corporation shall be managed in a manner that balances the stockholders’ 
pecuniary interests, the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s 
conduct, and the public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of 
incorporation. 
Id. (emphasis added). See also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-101-503(1) (2016) (providing a 
similar definition). 
 51. Although some U.S. benefit corporation statutes only call out director standards of conduct 
(leaving officer standards of conduct to the general corporate statutory and decisional law rules), some 
state acts do provide express standards of conduct for officers. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.  
§ 33-1360 (2016); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/4.10 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.11 
(2016). 
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 mandate, in satisfaction of the directors’ overall positional duties 
and considering the best interests of the corporation, board 
consideration of the effects of corporate action or inaction on the 
corporation’s general or specific public benefit and, in many 
statutes, on various constituencies (including shareholders, 
employees, customers, and the community), the environment, 
and short-term and long-term corporate interests; 
 disavow a requirement that the board prioritize, in its  
decision-making, shareholder financial interests or any other 
interest not identified as a priority interest in the corporation’s 
charter; 
 state that a director complying with the statutory standard of 
conduct is not liable for that conduct as a director; 
 expressly permit a benefit corporation to include in its charter a 
provision declaring that any disinterested failure to satisfy the 
statutory standard of conduct does not constitute a breach of the 
duty of loyalty; and 
 deny that any director owes a duty to a beneficiary of the public 
benefit purpose because of that person’s status as a beneficiary.52 
 
Professor Lyman Johnson notes that these provisions generally connect 
the benefit corporation’s best interests to its public benefit.53 However, he 
also aptly notes that many benefit corporation statutes then “take an odd 
turn” when they require the board to consider, along with that public 
benefit, constituencies other than those related to the public benefit.54 
Some states, however, have a different scheme for director standards 
of conduct—one that does not require the consideration of specific named 
stakeholders unconnected to the corporation’s actions or public benefit. 
Tennessee law, for example, provides that, to comply with his or her 
fiduciary duty: 
                                                     
 52. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT., § 10-2431 (2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1358 (2016); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.607 (2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.201 (2016). The listed attributes of 
state benefit corporation statutes addressing director fiduciary duties represent an aggregate sampling 
and are relatively typical, but (as the text notes) there is some variance from state to state. 
 53. See Johnson, supra note 25, at 288–89 (noting that by “keeping the focus on the corporation 
rather than on one stakeholder within the corporation, the [benefit corporation] statutes . . . coherently 
align the corporation’s best interests with the ongoing pursuit of the purpose(s) for which the 
corporation was formed”). 
 54. See id. at 289 (noting that benefit corporation laws of this kind “seem to formulate fiduciary 
duties in stakeholder terms, not in terms of the corporation’s best interests or furthering corporate 
purposes”). 
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[A] director shall consider the effects of any contemplated, proposed, 
or actual transaction or other conduct on the interests of those 
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, including the 
pecuniary interests of shareholders, and the public benefit or public 
benefits identified in its charter and shall not give regular, 
presumptive, or permanent priority to the interests of any individual 
constituency or limited group of constituencies materially affected by 
the corporation’s conduct, including the pecuniary interests of 
shareholders.55 
Delaware law focuses on a balancing of interests rather than a 
consideration of interests, providing that 
[t]he board of directors shall manage or direct the business and affairs 
of the public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the 
pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those 
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific 
public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of 
incorporation.56 
Colorado’s Benefit Corporation Act takes an almost identical approach to 
that taken under the Delaware law, requiring that 
[t]he board of directors . . . manage or direct the business and affairs 
of a public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the 
pecuniary interests of the shareholders, the best interests of those 
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific 
public benefit identified in its articles of incorporation.57 
Yet, both Delaware and Colorado benefit corporation law (like the benefit 
corporation laws of many other states, as noted at the end of the bullet 
                                                     
 55. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-106(a) (2016). Like the more typical U.S benefit corporation 
statutes, the Tennessee statute goes on to disclaim director duties to those with an interest in the 
corporation’s public benefit, provide that compliance with the statutory duty prevents a director from 
being held liable, and allow the corporation’s charter to provide that a “disinterested failure” to satisfy 
the board’s express standard of conduct does not “constitute an act or omission not in good faith, or a 
breach of the duty of loyalty” for fiduciary duty and indemnification purposes. § 48-28-106 (b) to (c). 
 56. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2016). The statute then proceeds, like the similar Tennessee 
provision, with duty and liability disclaimers (with a director discharging his or her fiduciary duties 
“if such director’s decision is both informed and disinterested and not such that no person of ordinary, 
sound judgment would approve”) and an express authorization to include in the corporation’s charter 
a provision obviating claims of bad faith and breach of the duty of loyalty (whether for fiduciary duty 
or indemnification purposes) if the failure to satisfy the standard of conduct is disinterested.  
§ 365(b)–(c). 
 57. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-101-506(1) (2016). The statute then continues much like the 
Delaware act, except that the permissive charter provision negating bad faith and breach of the duty 
of loyalty appears to be conditioned on whether the individual director at issue is disinterested.  
§ 7-101-506(2) to (3). 
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point list of common fiduciary duty provisions provided above)58 
expressly disclaim that directors owe fiduciary duties to the various named 
stakeholder beneficiaries.59 
The statutory expressions of benefit corporation management 
fiduciary duties differ from state to state. However, in each U.S. benefit 
corporation law, there is an unsurprising, fundamental anchoring 
proposition: the law requires directors (and, as applicable, officers) to 
consider the corporation’s public benefit in addition to any financial 
interest of shareholders.60 In this regard, Professor Alicia Plerhoples 
writes: 
A benefit corporation’s board and its individual directors are tasked 
with considering the impact of corporate actions on various 
stakeholders and the corporation’s general public benefit. Similarly, 
all officers of the corporation must consider the impact of the 
corporate actions on stakeholders if “the officer has discretion to act 
with respect to a matter” and “it reasonably appears to the officer that 
the matter may have a material effect on the creation by the benefit 
corporation of general public benefit or a specific public 
benefit . . . .”61 
As a result, corporate purpose (in the form of the benefit corporation’s 
public benefit or benefits) is an important foundation for fiduciary duty 
compliance in the U.S. benefit corporation. 
Thus, as the reader may have foreseen, the specific corporate purpose 
of a U.S. benefit corporation is a focal point for corporate organization and 
operations. The central role of corporate purpose in the benefit corporation 
context—from chartering through management dictates and fiduciary 
duties—suggests (among other things) particular litigation risks attendant 
to a benefit corporation’s stated public benefit or benefits. Identifying and 
describing these distinctive risks is important to both entity choice and a 
firm’s decision to raise capital in a public market. 
II. WHAT MAY BE THE KEY LITIGATION RISKS FOR PUBLICLY HELD  
U.S. BENEFIT CORPORATIONS? 
This Article focuses on litigation risk in the public company context. 
Having identified that specific focus, it is important to note two 
foundational conceptual matters relative to litigation risk in this setting—
first, that the causes of action in the private and publicly held benefit 
                                                     
 58. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 59. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-101-506(2)(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(b). 
 60. See Murray, supra note 1, at 33 (“Benefit corporation statutes state that directors must 
consider multiple stakeholders in each and every decision they make.”). 
 61. Plerhoples, supra note 26, at 117 (quoting MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301(a) (2014)). 
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corporation milieu may be quite similar to the extent they emanate from 
state corporate law and second, that a publicly held benefit corporation in 
the United States is likely to have a litigation risk profile that is much the 
same at its core as that for a publicly held U.S. corporation in general. 
These two fundamental observations expose certain litigation risks and 
focus attention on several principal causes of action that are likely to be 
significant challenges for publicly held U.S. benefit corporations. The 
remainder of this Part illuminates both the observations and the key causes 
of action. 
State law claims based on corporate law are largely independent of a 
corporation’s private or public ownership. The likelihood that claims will 
be brought, however, may be greater in a publicly held social enterprise 
corporation because shareholders and their objectives may be less 
homogeneous. In particular, individual holders of widely dispersed 
publicly held shares likely have no preexisting relationship with the firm 
or each other and may not weigh or balance the relative values of the 
financial, social, or environmental corporate purposes of a benefit 
corporation, as applicable, the same way.62 Managerial agency costs to 
shareholders may be less uniform and less certain than in a firm primarily 
aligned toward the production of shareholder financial wealth. In addition, 
some commentators have observed that publicly held firms are stronger 
magnets for litigation in the wake of twenty-first century regulatory 
reforms, including specifically the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.63 
Accordingly, while the nature of state corporate law claims may be the 
same for publicly held corporations as it is for privately held corporations, 
litigation risk may be higher for publicly held firms than for privately held 
firms. 
A publicly held benefit corporation in the United States shares 
litigation risk with publicly held U.S. corporations in general; many 
relevant trends in litigation involving publicly held firms generally would 
appear to be transferable in the publicly held U.S. benefit corporation 
setting. For example, shareholder litigation involving mergers and 
acquisitions has been prevalent among U.S. public companies (although 
perhaps is now declining somewhat),64 as has shareholder litigation 
                                                     
 62. See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 22, at 274 (“Public corporations, which are larger due to 
their publicly-traded shares, typically have thousands of shareholders, none of whom control the 
business. Most shareholders have no personal ties to the business, and institutional investors own a 
majority of the shares.”). 
 63. See, e.g., Eric L. Talley, Public Ownership, Firm Governance, and Litigation Risk, 76 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 335, 336–37 (2009). 
 64. See RAVI SINHA, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING 
ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES: REVIEW OF 2015 AND 1H 2016 M&A LITIGATION (2016), 
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Acquisitions-
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involving exclusive forum selection bylaws and other intra-corporate 
litigation management processes.65 Opportunistic behavior of the 
plaintiffs’ bar is a key driver of overall public company litigation trends in 
the for-profit corporation setting generally.66 One would expect that 
behavior to have similar impacts on litigation trends involving (and, 
therefore, the litigations risks for) publicly held benefit corporations 
specifically. 
Given these general observations, a publicly held U.S. benefit 
corporation should expect that disgruntled shareholders desiring to 
vindicate their complaints would focus primarily on state actions alleging 
a breach of fiduciary duty and federal actions for securities fraud. Yet, the 
importance of corporate purpose in the benefit corporation and the 
introduction of statutory causes of action raises the specter of state law 
claims outside the fiduciary duty context that are uncommon in publicly 
held firms not organized as benefit corporations. Moreover, the context 
and nuances of fiduciary duty and securities fraud actions brought against 
a publicly held U.S. benefit corporation may be different from those for 
similar causes of action against the typical publicly held U.S. corporation 
not organized as a benefit corporation. 
Specifically, a shareholder grievance against a publicly held benefit 
corporation is likely to include claims that the corporation has taken action 
or is operating outside the scope of its promised social enterprise 
objectives (i.e., its corporate purpose).67 Accordingly, shareholder 
                                                     
2016 [https://perma.cc/QY33-G43H] (documenting recent trends in public company merger and 
acquisition litigation). 
 65. See, e.g., Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract, 96 B.U. L. REV. 485 (2016) 
(describing the debates and analyzing recent legal actions involving these shareholder litigation 
management tactics). 
 66. See, e.g., Brian Cheffins et al., Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the 
Plaintiffs’ Bar, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 427 (describing general trends affecting the plaintiffs’ bar 
and their contribution to shareholder/investor litigation). 
 67. These claims effectively constitute investor claims of greenwashing akin to those raised by 
consumers based on alleged false advertising of products or services. See Miriam A. Cherry, The Law 
and Economics of Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 281, 
282 (2014) (“Greenwashing occurs when a corporation increases its sales or boosts its brand image 
through environmental rhetoric or advertising, but in reality does not make good on these 
environmental claims.”); Mitch Nass, Note, The Viability of Benefit Corporations: An Argument for 
Greater Transparency and Accountability, 39 J. CORP. L. 875, 877 (2014) (“‘Greenwashing’ is a 
marketing strategy that seeks to capitalize on the demand for socially conscious corporations’ products 
and services provided by advertising green initiatives that may or may not accurately represent the 
company’s actual goals and behavior.”). Investment greenwashing has been a concern in benefit 
corporation legislation. See, e.g., Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 1, at 33 (“[W]ithout 
at least some minimal level of board accountability, the benefit corporation statute could be an avenue 
to greenwashing and faux CSR rather than an antidote to them.”); Kennan Khatib, Comment, The 
Harms of the Benefit Corporation, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 151 (2015) (asserting that the benefit 
corporation form encourages greenwashing); Herrick K. Lidstone, Jr., The Long and Winding Road to 
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disputes might be vindicated through state law ultra vires actions (legal 
proceedings alleging that corporate action is beyond the scope of the 
powers that the corporation has the authority to exercise)68 and statutory 
causes of action designed to hold a benefit corporation to its promised 
public benefit or benefits. Similarly, state fiduciary duty and federal 
securities fraud actions against publicly held U.S. benefit corporations 
might focus on the benefit corporation’s failure to conduct its business and 
operations in a manner consistent with its public benefit or benefits. This 
Part briefly explores these potential causes of action. 
A. State Law Actions 
Publicly held U.S. benefit corporations with shareholder complaints 
about the firm’s adherence to its corporate purpose should expect to see 
ultra vires and similar statutory claims brought under state corporate law 
focusing specifically on those complaints.69 However, the facts underlying 
that type of action may also support a claim that the corporate directors 
breached their fiduciary duties under state corporate law—specifically a 
breach of the duty of loyalty and, if a separately constituted legal action, a 
breach of good faith.70 The likelihood that any of these state-law-based 
cases will be brought depends on, among other things, the precise facts at 
issue and the remedies sought; facts may not be sufficient to support a 
particular claim, or a viable claim may not allow an aggrieved claimant to 
a desired remedy.71 For example, shareholders may be able to prevail on a 
                                                     
Public Benefit Corporations in Colorado, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2014, at 39, 44–45 (describing aspects of 
the greenwashing issue in the benefit corporation context). 
 68. See, e.g., Charles E. Carpenter, Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires Be Discarded?, 33 YALE 
L.J. 49, 49 (1923) (“If the corporation enters into a transaction which is beyond the powers expressly 
or impliedly contained in the charter or articles of incorporation or in violation of the statutory 
restriction, the transaction is said to be ultra vires, i.e., beyond the powers of the corporation.”); 
Michael A. Schaeftler, The Purpose Clause in the Certificate of Incorporation: A Clause in Search of 
a Purpose, 58 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 476, 478 (2012) (“An attempt by a corporation to act beyond its 
purposes or powers is considered to be an ultra vires activity . . . .”). 
 69. Although this is the author’s prediction, others have acknowledged the possibility of legal 
action on ultra vires actions involving benefit corporations. See, e.g., John Tyler et al., Producing 
Better Mileage: Advancing the Design and Usefulness of Hybrid Vehicles for Social Business 
Ventures, 33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 235, 265 (2015) (“Perhaps an attorney general might be able to 
assert that a given benefit corporation’s activities are ultra vires if they did not consider the effects of 
their decisions on the designated interests, and two thirds of the shareholders did not vote to ratify the 
actions or convert to regular corporate status.”). 
 70. Legal actions for breach of fiduciary duty are often brought as shareholder derivative actions 
against directors and officers and not against the corporation itself. See infra note 116 and 
accompanying text (on derivative actions for breach of fiduciary duty). Nevertheless, the subject 
corporation is an active player in shareholder derivative litigation and bears litigation risk (albeit not 
the prospect of a detrimental monetary judgment) as a result. 
 71. This is endemic to the process of choosing an optimal cause of action through which to 
pursue a claim for wrongful conduct. See, e.g., McFaul v. Ramsey, 61 U.S. 523, 525 (1857) (“The 
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claim that benefit corporation directors approved a corporate transaction 
that is beyond the corporation’s powers as defined by statutory law and 
the corporation’s charter, entitling them to injunctive relief; yet, the 
directors’ approval of the transaction may not have violated applicable 
standards of conduct or liability that would result in damages payable to 
the corporation. In all, the specifics of fiduciary duty law, general 
corporate law, and benefit corporation law make it unlikely that benefit 
corporations and their managers will be held liable.72 
To illustrate these points about state law claims in the publicly held 
benefit corporation context, a summary of certain general related 
considerations under benefit corporation law may be helpful. The 
remainder of this Part provides that summary. Unless otherwise noted, 
although the focus of the analysis is publicly held benefit corporations, the 
causes of action, claims, and limitations described in this Part are available 
in court proceedings involving privately held or publicly held benefit 
corporations. 
1. Ultra Vires and Similar Statutory Claims 
A corporation acting outside the bounds of its statutory and  
charter-based purposes and powers to act often is said to be acting in a 
manner that is ultra vires.73  
Through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the ultra vires 
doctrine was central to corporate law. Limiting the corporation’s 
legal authority to certain powers enumerated in the corporate charter, 
the doctrine was considered an important tool to protect the state’s 
interest in restricting the power and size of corporations and to protect 
the shareholders from managerial overreaching.74  
While the doctrine has not been an active basis for legal actions (especially 
since the advent of general corporate purpose clauses75), it continues to be 
a possible litigable claim.76 
                                                     
distinction between the different forms of actions for different wrongs, requiring different remedies, 
lies in the nature of things . . . .”). 
 72. See Murray, supra note 1, at 33–36 (noting and explaining this overall difficulty in holding 
benefit corporation directors accountable for their allegedly wrongful corporate conduct). 
 73. See Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (with 
Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1302 
(2001) (“Traditionally, the corporation’s powers were limited to the explicit objects of the corporation 
as defined in the corporate charter.”). 
 74. Greenfield, supra note 73, at 1302. 
 75. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 76. See generally Greenfield, supra note 73, at 1360 (“[T]he traditional doctrine of ultra vires, 
thought to be defunct, is in fact alive in important respects.”); Sulkowsi & Greenfield, supra note 27, 
at 930 (“[T]he [ultra vires] doctrine was almost done away with during the 1900s inasmuch as 
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To that point, “[t]he incorporation statutes of forty-nine states allow 
these states to dissolve a corporation or enjoin it from engaging in ultra 
vires activities—that is, activities outside of the corporation’s authority.”77 
In a 2005 law review article, Professors Adam Sulkowski and Kent 
Greenfield identify advantages and disadvantages to ultra vires actions.78 
While actions alleging ultra vires activity are not often discussed as a 
litigation alternative, they seem like a more obvious option in the benefit 
corporation context given the distinguishing and strong role of corporate 
purpose in the benefit corporation form. 
The ultra vires doctrine protects the shareholders’ interest in the firm 
more broadly than a pure financial wealth maximization norm. 
[T]he doctrine “was seen as essential for the protection of the 
investing public.” The notion was that shareholders made investment 
decisions based in part on the scope of permissible business activities 
in which a corporation could engage. The specific activities listed in 
the corporate charter were regarded as an important part of the 
“contract” between shareholders and the firm (and its management). 
It was assumed that shareholders cared which activities the firm 
engaged in, and if the firm went beyond the activities specified in the 
corporate charter it was a violation of the firm’s contractual duty to 
the shareholders. The ultra vires doctrine enforced the limitation on 
the corporation’s activities even when the unauthorized venture was 
likely to be profitable.79 
We may presume that the corporation’s articulated benefit purpose 
motivates shareholder investments in benefit corporations, and as a result, 
we may expect a high level of shareholder engagement with the adherence 
of board and officer conduct to that benefit purpose. Accordingly, a 
publicly held benefit corporation with disaffected shareholders should 
expect ultra vires litigation if the shareholder complaints include a failure 
of the corporation to adhere to its articulated corporate purpose. 
                                                     
companies are now free to alter their field of business as they wish, a narrow slice of this doctrine 
remains.”). 
 77. Sulkowsi & Greenfield, supra note 27, at 945. 
 78. See id. at 949–52. The stated advantages include: “no ambiguous standard or difficult 
threshold to hurdle,” “fewer unforeseeable contingencies and fewer evidentiary burdens,” and “the 
remedies allowed for in all states except North Dakota are either equitable relief (including 
injunctions) or the dissolution of the company.” Id. at 949. Two obstacles to a successful ultra vires 
claim are identified: “producing evidence that a company is presently engaging in unlawful conduct 
and then convincing the judge to use the court’s powers in equity to enforce the relevant law by 
requiring action or the cessation of action by the company.” Id. at 950. The coauthors further note that 
“[t]he key limitation to the ultra vires doctrine is that it will work only when a corporation is violating 
a law in a jurisdiction where it is engaged in a business activity.” Id. at 961–52. 
 79. Greenfield, supra note 73, at 1304–05 (footnotes omitted). 
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In seeming recognition of this fact, laws in many states adopting the 
benefit corporation form create an express statutory cause of action to 
enforce compliance with the corporation’s public benefit, most often 
called a “benefit enforcement proceeding.”80 The action may be brought 
directly or derivatively, but derivative plaintiffs must meet a relatively 
high threshold level of share ownership (typically 2% or 5% beneficial or 
record ownership) to have standing.81 The plaintiff in a benefit 
enforcement proceeding cannot seek monetary damages for the benefit 
corporation’s “failure . . . to [pursue or] create a general public benefit or 
any specific public benefit.”82 However, benefit corporation statutes 
typically provide for the reimbursement of the plaintiff’s attorney fees if a 
court determines that the failed compliance is “without substantial 
justification” or “without justification.”83 Finally, benefit corporation 
statutes providing for benefit enforcement proceedings may foreclose 
                                                     
 80. See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Regulating Social Enterprise, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 231, 
239 (2014) (“[B]enefit corporations [sic] shareholders can sue to enforce directors’ obligations, 
including in a special benefit enforcement proceeding authorized by many statutes”); Nass, supra note 
67, at 886 (“The unique enforcement provision that many benefit corporation statutes share is the 
benefit enforcement proceeding. This is a right of action granted to company insiders who seek 
enforcement of the company’s duty to further a public benefit.”) (footnotes omitted). Research for this 
Article in March 2016 identified benefit enforcement proceeding provisions in the benefit corporation 
laws of the following states: California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Carolina. 
 81. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1362(c) (West 2014): 
A benefit enforcement proceeding may be commenced or maintained only (1) directly by 
the benefit corporation, or (2) derivatively in accordance with the provisions of chapter 601 
by (A) a person or group of persons that owns beneficially or of record not less than five 
per cent of the total number of shares of a class or series outstanding at the time of the act 
or omission complained of, (B) a person or group of persons that owns beneficially or of 
record ten per cent or more of the outstanding equity interests in an entity of which the 
benefit corporation is a majority-owned subsidiary at the time of the act or omission 
complained of, or (C) other persons as specified in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws 
of the benefit corporation. 
 82. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1362(b) (“A benefit corporation shall not be liable 
for monetary damages under sections 33-1352–33-1364, inclusive, for any failure of the benefit 
corporation to pursue or create a general public benefit or any specific public benefit.”); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 35-1-1412(3) (2015) (“A benefit corporation is not liable for monetary damages for any failure 
of the benefit corporation to create general public benefit or a specific public benefit.”). 
 83. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-19-272(a) (1987) (“[I]n any civil action commenced or appealed 
in any court of record in this state, the court shall award . . . reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs against 
any attorney or party, or both, who has brought a civil action, or asserted a claim therein, or interposed 
a defense, that a court determines to be without substantial justification, either in whole or part.”); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1412(4) (“If the court in a benefit enforcement proceeding finds that a 
failure to comply with this part was without justification, the court may award an amount sufficient to 
reimburse the plaintiff for the reasonable expenses incurred by the plaintiff, including attorney fees 
and expenses, in connection with the benefit enforcement proceeding.”). 
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ultra vires actions as a matter of positive law.84 Accordingly, as a means 
of holding benefit corporations and their management to the corporation’s 
chartered benefit purpose, the benefit enforcement proceeding is a 
relatively dominant, albeit weak (because of the limits on plaintiffs and 
the unavailability of monetary damages), accountability tool, and the 
statutes providing for it may preclude common law ultra vires claims.85 
2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims 
Benefit corporation shareholder dissatisfaction may also manifest 
itself in actions for breach of fiduciary duty—whether alleged to occur in 
the general, ongoing monitoring or management of the corporation or in 
specific decision-making on transactions or other conduct. These actions 
may assert traditional fiduciary duty claims (e.g., that the directors have 
acted in a manner inconsistent with good faith or the duties of care or 
loyalty)86 or claims that the directors failed to discharge the specific 
standards of conduct made applicable to them under the state’s benefit 
corporation statute (detailed supra Part I.3). 
Delaware judicial opinions constitute the leading body of corporate 
fiduciary duty law in the United States and are especially important for 
existing publicly traded firms (which are overwhelmingly Delaware 
corporations).87 To the extent that current Delaware fiduciary duty law 
directs corporate boards or officers to prioritize shareholder interests 
(especially financial wealth interests) over either the firm’s chartered 
corporate purpose or nonshareholder constituencies required to be 
considered under benefit corporation statutes,88 we may expect that law to 
                                                     
 84. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1362(a) (“Except in a benefit enforcement 
proceeding, no person may bring an action or assert a claim against a benefit corporation or its directors 
or officers with respect to . . . the failure to pursue or create a general public benefit or any specific 
public benefit identified in its certificate of incorporation . . . .”); 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 3325(a)(1) (West 2013) (“Except in a benefit enforcement proceeding, no person may bring an action 
or assert a claim against a benefit corporation or its directors or officers with respect to . . . failure to 
pursue or create general public benefit or a specific public benefit set forth in its articles.”). 
 85. Accord Nass, supra note 67, at 886–88 (engaging a similar analysis). 
 86. Director liability for monetary damages for a failure to discharge the duty of care are 
discounted here because of the prevalence of exculpation provisions, but breaches of the duty of care 
may be alleged against officers or to seek equitable relief or contest the applicability of the business 
judgment rule. See Julian Velasco, A Defense of the Corporate Law Duty of Care, 40 J. CORP. L. 647, 
656–57 (2015). 
 87. See Lisa L. Casey, Twenty-Eight Words: Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties through 
Criminal Prosecution of Honest Services Fraud, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2010) (“Executives of most 
public companies look to Delaware law for the content and enforcement of their fiduciary duties.”); 
Pamela Mathy, Honest Services Fraud After Skilling, 42 ST. MARY’S L.J. 645, 723 (2011) (“It is well 
accepted that many public companies incorporate in Delaware to ensure that Delaware law’s limitation 
on director and officer personal liability will apply to any alleged breaches of fiduciary duties.”). 
 88. The potential application of Revlon duties in a benefit corporation context provides an 
example. This is an uncertain area under benefit corporation law, to say the least. See, e.g., infra notes 
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be inapplicable in any judicial review of board conduct in the benefit 
corporation setting. Yet, those expectations may not be valid. Over time, 
judicial opinions interpreting managerial fiduciary duties in the benefit 
corporation context will offer us insights on the elements of general 
corporate fiduciary duty law that apply under benefit corporation law.  
Benefit corporation legislation compromises the relative certainty and 
predictability of Delaware fiduciary duty law. 
Delaware law’s treatment of good faith questions may lead to 
different results in the application of benefit corporation fiduciary duty law 
in the various states. Delaware law conceptualizes good faith as a 
component of the duty of loyalty.89 As previously noted, benefit 
corporation statutes may allow a benefit corporation to provide in its 
charter that disinterested failures to comply with the statutory standards of 
conduct are not actionable as breaches of the duty of loyalty.90 As a result, 
actions against Delaware benefit corporations for breach of fiduciary duty 
alleging a lack of good faith would not be available in firms with those 
charter provisions unless the allegations of bad faith also included facts 
establishing self-interest. However, courts applying the fiduciary duty law 
of jurisdictions that recognize a separate cause of action for breach of good 
faith claims may allow those claims to proceed notwithstanding the 
corporation’s inclusion of the permitted charter provisions excepting 
disinterested conduct from the duty of loyalty.91 
                                                     
108–111 and accompanying text. See generally Sean W. Brownridge, Canning Plum Organics: The 
Avant-Garde Campbell Soup Company Acquisition and Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 
Wandering Revlon-Land, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 703 (2015) (noting the uncertainty, positing solutions to 
key questions, and proposing a new framework); Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New 
Tricks? Applying Traditional Corporate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13 
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 221 (2012) (examining the Revlon doctrine in the flexible purpose 
corporation context). 
 89. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[T]he 
fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary 
conflict of interest. It also encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith.”). 
 90. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (representing a list of typical provisions in benefit 
corporation statutes, including provisions that “expressly permit a benefit corporation to include in its 
charter a provision declaring that any disinterested failure to satisfy the statutory standard of conduct 
does not constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty”). 
 91. Both Colorado and Tennessee law address this possibility directly in their respective statutes. 
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-101-506(3) (West 2014) (“The articles of incorporation of a public 
benefit corporation may include a provision that a disinterested director’s failure to satisfy this section 
does not, for the purposes of section 7-108-401 or article 109 of this title, constitute an act or omission 
not in good faith or a breach of the duty of loyalty.” (emphasis added)); TENN. CODE ANN.  
§ 48-28-106(c) (West 2016) (“The charter of a for-profit benefit corporation may include a provision 
that any disinterested failure to satisfy this section shall not, for the purposes of §§ 48-18-301 to -303 
or §§ 48-18-501 to -509, constitute an act or omission not in good faith, or a breach of the duty of 
loyalty.” (emphasis added)). 
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As a general matter, assuming a viable fiduciary duty claim, the 
liability or financial responsibility of corporate directors for breaches of 
fiduciary duty may be narrowed through the application of up to four 
mandatory or permissive aspects of corporate law. These include 
exculpation for breaches of the duty of care, indemnification (statutory and 
privately ordered), director and officer liability insurance, and the possible 
application of the business judgment rule in the judicial review process.92 
Officers, as well as directors, may benefit from indemnification, 
insurance, or the business judgment rule.93 
These same protections are—or may be—available to directors and 
officers in the benefit corporation context. Yet, where available, the 
application of these protections to fiduciary duty litigation involving 
managers of benefit corporations remains untested because benefit 
corporation fiduciary duty litigation is, itself, untested. For example, 
courts may reconsider whether, and if so when, to apply the business 
judgment rule to review alleged breaches of duty arising under benefit 
corporation law.94 Under applicable rules in some state benefit corporation 
statutes, the board must consider the effects of its conduct on specific 
constituencies as well as the corporation’s charter-based public benefit or 
public benefits.95 This statutory requirement decreases the discretion 
afforded to corporate management (by specifically defining what 
management must consider) and limits the need for and reliance on 
management expertise. Accordingly, statutory considerations may 
undercut the rationale for, or decrease the need for, the business judgment 
rule.96 To the extent that courts adopting the business judgment rule credit 
management discretion and expertise in managing the firm as a rationale 
                                                     
 92. See Todd M. Aman, Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business Judgment Rule: A Critique in 
Light of the Financial Meltdown, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1, 15 (2010–2011) (“[T]he vast majority of directors 
receive protection from liability risk (through the business judgment rule, exculpation statutes, 
insurance, indemnification, and so on).”); Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an 
Emerging Fiduciary Duty to Consider Human Rights?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 75, 92 (2005) (“[T]he 
combination of the business judgment rule, indemnification, insurance, and exculpation, . . . together 
produce[s] . . . a low risk of personal liability.”). 
 93. There is some debate about the applicability of the business judgment rule to the decisions 
and actions of corporate officers. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate 
Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 414 (2013) (“[N]either 
the doctrinal nor policy aspects of the business judgment rule have been settled with respect to 
officers[.]”). This Article assumes for the sake of its argument that the rule may apply to officers. 
 94. The ill-understood and contested rationales for the business judgment rule may increase the 
likelihood of a challenge to the rule in novel contexts. See, e.g., Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate 
Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 454 (2005) (noting “deep-rooted 
disagreement about the basic purpose and thrust of the business judgment rule” in addressing its 
application to corporate officers). 
 95. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
 96. See generally Brownridge, supra note 88, at 727–30; Johnson, supra note 93, at 411–13 
(noting the formulations and rationales for the business judgment rule). 
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for use of the business judgment rule,97 why should a court give any credit 
to directors or officers for complying with a statutory duty requiring them 
to take specific constituencies and matters into consideration—a duty that 
limits management discretion and the exercise of management expertise? 
Moreover, if the business judgment rule does apply, we should expect that 
the subsequent judicial assessment of a rational business purpose would 
take into account the specific, express, chartered corporate purpose of the 
firm.98 
Difficult unanswered questions also exist in connection with benefit 
corporation cash-out mergers and other conflicting interest transactions 
that may invoke an entire fairness review of a transaction. In adjudicating 
conflicting interest claims involving U.S. publicly held benefit 
corporations, the judiciary has a chance to revisit the notions of fair dealing 
(process) and fair price as components of entire fairness, as identified and 
described under, for example, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.99 For instance, one 
might ask how the statutorily required management considerations impact 
(if at all) the notion or analysis of fair dealing. Moreover, benefit 
corporation management and legal counsel will want to consider, in 
moving forward with a transaction that could be subject to entire fairness 
review, how the concept or evaluation of fair price may be affected by a 
corporation’s public benefit or any related nonfinancial value that inures 
to shareholders as a result of the transaction. 
Additional doctrinal uncertainty may result from the application of 
enhanced judicial review of board decision-making under Unocal100 and 
                                                     
 97. See Johnson, supra note 93, at 412 (“Delaware courts frequently ground the rule in that 
section of the corporate statute providing that the business and affairs of a corporation are to be 
managed by or under the direction of its board.”). 
 98. The judicial conception of a rational business purpose in the general for-proft corporate 
context is broad enough to encompass objectives other than shareholder wealth maximization as a 
general matter. See Kevin V. Tu, Socially Conscious Corporations and Shareholder Profit, 84 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 121, 139 (2016) (“The application of the business judgment rule also shows that a 
rational business purpose is not narrowly limited directly to the pursuit of shareholder profit in the 
short term.”). Benefit corporation law expressly opens a whole new avenue for breadth in this area: 
Benefit corporations open the door for irresponsible directors to justify their actions 
(including self-interested actions) by pointing to some public benefit justification (or 
alternatively when public benefit is involved, to some private shareholder benefit 
justification). Managerial accountability has proven difficult in for-profit enterprises, and 
it is difficult to conceptualize accountability in a hybrid entity with both broad general 
public purposes and narrow private purposes. 
J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed: How Benefit Corporations Address 
Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and Suggestions for Change, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 85, 108 
(2012) (footnote omitted). 
 99. 457 A.2d 701, 711–15 (Del. 1983). 
 100. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
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Unitrin.101 Under Unocal’s first prong,102 for example, what is a “danger 
to corporate policy and effectiveness”103 in the benefit corporation context 
(which assumes the best interests of the corporation involve more than the 
maximization of shareholder financial wealth)? What are “reasonable 
grounds for belief”104 in that danger in this environment? The second 
prong of Unocal105 also provides food for thought as applied to benefit 
corporations. In particular, to the extent that existing judicial doctrine is 
founded on shareholders with exclusive or primary interests in financial 
wealth maximization, a court may construe coercion or the range of 
reasonableness differently under Unitrin.106 Several commentators 
provide useful information and preliminary insights on some of these 
questions.107 
Revlon108 duties, however, as originated in Delaware and applied in 
a number of other states with benefit corporation statutes, present an even 
clearer opportunity for a conflict between existing fiduciary duty doctrine 
and benefit corporation law in a takeover defense environment. A number 
of scholars and other pundits have already commented on the applicability 
and relevance of Revlon to a benefit corporation’s decision to engage in 
deal protection tactics.109 One commentator aptly summarizes the potential 
for dissonance in a cogent paragraph: 
Public benefit corporations . . . are, of course, novel ideas within the 
realm of Delaware corporate law. In some instances, this novelty 
clashes with the well-settled decisions of Delaware business courts, 
most notably that of Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
Inc., a 1986 decision issued by the Supreme Court of Delaware. In its 
                                                     
 101. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
 102. Under Unocal, the judicial review of director actions approving corporate defenses from an 
unsolicited change in control is frequently said to have two prongs, the first of which requires directors 
to prove a “danger to corporate policy or effectiveness”—a threat to the firm—and the second of which 
requires directors to prove that the defensive action taken is proportional to the threat. See, e.g., 
Murray, Defending Patagonia, supra note 26, at 490–91; Bernard S. Sharfman, A Theory of 
Shareholder Activism and its Place in Corporate Law, 82 TENN. L. REV. 791, 824–25 (2015); Robert 
B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: “Sacred Space” 
in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 282–83 (2001). 
 103. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 955–56. 
 106. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1386–88 (defining and describing the role of coercion and the 
range of reasonableness under Unocal). 
 107. See generally Sean W. Brownridge, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Unocal and the Defensive 
Mechanism Hidden in Corporate Benefit Purpose, 60 VILL. L. REV. 903 (2015). See also Murray, 
Defending Patagonia, supra note 26, at 490–94. 
 108. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 109. See, e.g., Brownridge, supra note 88 (providing an analysis of the application of Revlon to 
benefit corporations); Murray, Defending Patagonia, supra note 26, at 495–98 (describing “Revlon-
land” in the context of benefit corporations). 
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most basic formulation, Revlon holds that “when a target board of 
directors enters Revlon-land, the board’s role changes from that of 
‘defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with 
getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.’ 
Less colloquially, Revlon-land is the space in which the duty of a 
target corporation’s board shifts from corporate preservation to 
maximization of the company’s value for the benefit of the 
shareholders.110 
The challenges to directors and officers, corporate legal advisors, and the 
judiciary are palpable, and a showdown on the central questions relative 
to the application of fiduciary duty doctrine in this context is seemingly 
inevitable unless (and perhaps even if) legislatures directly address the 
potential for conflict between the statutory duties of benefit corporation 
management and judicially construed management fiduciary duties under 
Revlon.111 
However, U.S. benefit corporation statutes also provide new 
protections to corporate management. Most prominently, they permit 
limitations of director liability for disinterested breaches of duty by 
authorizing charter provisions that customize the duty of loyalty to exclude 
a disinterested failure to satisfy the applicable statutory standard of 
conduct.112 In practical reality, absent the possibility that a specific, 
separate cause of action may be brought asserting action or inaction 
lacking in good faith,113 director liability for a breach of the duty of loyalty 
would have to rest on a conflicting interest. State benefit corporation acts 
also restrict potential claimants in an action against directors by providing 
that directors do not owe duties to any beneficiaries of the corporation’s 
public benefit purpose as a result of that beneficiary status.114 Thus, 
although new director and officer fiduciary duties exist in the benefit 
corporation context, liability for breach of these duties (and any resulting 
in terrorem effect) has been statutorily limited. 
These doctrinal issues are significant. But, they do not provide the 
entire picture of fiduciary duty litigation risk. Litigation risk assessment 
should take into account the nature of the cause of action in addition to the 
substantive claim. Management breaches of fiduciary duty most 
commonly are adjudicated in class actions or shareholder derivative 
                                                     
 110. Brownridge, supra note 88, at 706 (footnotes omitted). 
 111. Accord id. at 749 (“[T]he Delaware legislature should clearly delineate how the interests in 
Section 365(a) are to be balanced, and the Delaware business courts should carefully evaluate how 
Revlon applies to public benefit corporation directors who find themselves in Revlon-land, so as to 
articulate a standard, one way or the other, that brings clarity to the matter.”). 
 112. See generally supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 113. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 114. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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actions.115 Despite some decisional law references to a fiduciary duty to 
the corporation and its stockholders or shareholders, in most  
decision-making contexts, the fiduciary duties of corporate management 
are owed to the corporation and the corporation is entitled to any relief 
awarded.116 The cases brought in connection with mergers and acquisitions 
are a large exception, typically generating class action litigation rather than 
shareholder derivative litigation.117 
Although the process of class action litigation is untouched by 
benefit corporation law, under some state benefit corporation statutes, 
derivative actions for breach of the statutorily mandated fiduciary duties 
are expressly contemplated and addressed. Delaware’s benefit corporation 
law, for example, provides that: 
Stockholders of a public benefit corporation owning individually or 
collectively, as of the date of instituting such derivative suit, at least 
2% of the corporation’s outstanding shares or, in the case of a 
corporation with shares listed on a national securities exchange, the 
lesser of such percentage or shares of at least $2,000,000 in market 
value, may maintain a derivative lawsuit to enforce the requirements 
set forth in § 365(a) of this title.118 
The benefit corporation statutes in Colorado and Tennessee include a 
substantially similar provision.119 
By affording a right of action only to derivative plaintiffs having a 
requisite percentage or dollar value of shareholdings, benefit corporation 
laws may decrease the prospect of fiduciary duty enforcement litigation. 
Although the 2% threshold level of ownership for derivative actions under 
the Colorado, Delaware, and Tennessee statutes is lower than the standard 
5% test for benefit enforcement actions,120 2% still is a high threshold of 
ownership for shareholder rights in a publicly held corporation. Even a 1% 
threshold seems high in the public company context.121 Retail investors 
                                                     
 115. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative 
Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1762 (2004). 
 116. See David J. Beck, The Legal Profession at the Crossroads: Who Will Write the Future 
Rules Governing the Conduct of Lawyers Representing Public Corporations?, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 
873, 889 (2003) (“A corporation’s shareholders ordinarily cannot bring an individual suit to recover 
for a wrong committed solely against the corporation, even if the shareholders also suffer damages as 
a result of the wrong. . . .”). 
 117. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 115, at 1762. 
 118. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 367 (2013). 
 119. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-101-508 (West 2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-108 (2016). 
 120. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 121. Contra Patty M. DeGaetano, The Shareholder Direct Access Teeter-Totter: Will Increased 
Shareholder Voice in the Director Nomination Process Protect Investors?, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 361, 
413 (2005) (“The one percent threshold to place a shareholder access proposal on the ballot is too low. 
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would be highly unlikely to own that high a threshold of ownership in a 
public company, although institutional investors (which typically are less 
likely to bring legal actions against the firms in which they invest) may 
cross a 1% or 2% level of public company ownership.122 The composition 
of equity investors in publicly held benefit corporations is a matter about 
which much speculation exists. Institutional investors may or may not play 
a significant role in this sector of the market for publicly traded securities 
once it emerges. Moreover, an observer’s view on the perceived 
appropriateness of a required level of ownership for the exercise of a 
shareholder right depends on the observer’s assessment of the costs and 
benefits associated with that shareholder right. It is important to note in 
this context the existence of an alternative market value test for 
corporations with exchange-traded securities.123 In a firm with a high 
market capitalization or per-share values, it may be easier, but still not 
easy, for a disgruntled shareholder to qualify under this market value test. 
In addition, under benefit corporation laws that provide for benefit 
enforcement proceedings,124 legal actions for a failure to comply with the 
benefit corporation standards of conduct for directors are expressly 
foreclosed. Shareholders are relegated to using a benefit enforcement 
proceeding to advance these kinds of claims in court.125 This cause of 
action is legislatively constructed and unique to benefit corporations.126 
Putative shareholder plaintiffs also must qualify with a threshold level of 
ownership of shares in the corporation in order to bring suit.127 
Thus, judicial accountability tools are relatively weak, and limits on 
management liability for fiduciary duty breaches in state benefit 
corporation statutes are relatively strong. In states where they are 
                                                     
This would allow, in essence, ‘the tail to wag the dog,’ because only one of a company’s shareholders 
would be able to set a costly and time-consuming process in motion.”). 
 122. See, e.g., id. at 396 n.209 (“[O]f publicly traded companies, the SEC estimated that 84% 
have at least one institutional shareholder that has maintained ownership of at least 1% of the shares 
outstanding for one year. Even so, submission of security holder proposals by large holders is rare, 
based on a review of a sample of 237 security holder proposals in 2002, where only three were found 
to have been submitted by a holder of more than 1% of the shares outstanding, and all three of those 
were submitted by the same security holder.” (citations omitted)); Alicia Davis Evans, The Investor 
Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 223, 246 (2007) (“Because it is unlikely that any one retail investor 
will hold a 1% stake in a public company, generally institutions will be the only stockholders with the 
independent power (i.e., not as a part of a group) to initiate proceedings. The managers of such 
institutions, as sophisticated businesspeople, are unlikely to file charges that lack merit.”). 
 123. See, e.g., supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 124. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
 125. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1362(a) (2014) (“Except in a benefit enforcement 
proceeding, no person may bring an action or assert a claim against a benefit corporation or its directors 
or officers with respect to . . . the violation of an obligation, duty or standard of conduct under sections 
33-1352 to 33-1364, inclusive.”). 
 126. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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available, shareholder derivative actions are constrained to classes of 
plaintiffs based on the percentage or market value of their ownership 
interests. Shareholder access to benefit enforcement proceedings is 
similarly restricted.128 When layered onto the liability protections that 
benefit corporation management may have available, the regulation of 
causes of action in the benefit corporation context complete an overall 
picture of limited accountability. 
B. Federal Securities Fraud and Misstatement Claims 
Benefit corporation law does not address federal securities law 
engagement or compliance, except indirectly (e.g., by reference to benefit 
corporations having exchange-traded shares129). This is unsurprising 
because the statutory and regulatory schemes have different objectives. 
The focus of securities regulation is not to protect corporate purpose or the 
best interest of the firm; rather, securities regulation protects investors, 
markets, and capital raising generally.130 Yet, for benefit corporations to 
survive, they must engage in financing activities, and some of those 
involve the sale and purchase of financial instruments recognized as 
securities. 
Publicly traded benefit corporations, like other public companies, 
will be actively regulated under both legal regimes.131 Most aspects of 
securities regulation (and the accompanying potential for litigation) should 
be the same for both general for-profit corporations and benefit 
corporations. However, the risk of specific types of securities fraud claims 
against U.S. public benefit corporations may be anticipated. 
                                                     
 128. See supra notes 118–127 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 130. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, What is a Security in the Crowdfunding Era?, 7 OHIO 
ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 335, 337 (2012) (“Although variously stated, the key policies 
underlying U.S. securities regulation are the protection of investors and the maintenance of the 
integrity of the national securities markets, with the overall objective of enhancing prospects for capital 
formation to sustain business activity and growth.”); Meeka Jun, New Capital Markets and Securities 
Regulations in Hungary: A Comparative Analysis of the Insider Trading Regulations in Hungary and 
the United States, 19 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1047, 1067–68 (1993) (“The stated policy of the securities 
regulations is to foster capital flow, to promote securities markets, and to safeguard investors.”); 
Constance Z. Wagner, Securities Fraud in Cyberspace: Reaching the Outer Limits of the Federal 
Securities Laws, 80 NEB. L. REV. 920, 928–29 (2001) (describing these policies as “protection of 
investors, ensuring that markets are fair, efficient, and transparent, and reducing systemic risk”). 
 131. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad 
Approach to the Shareholder Bylaw Debate, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 26 (2011) (“A typical public 
company in the United States will find itself regulated by corporate law made in Delaware and 
securities regulation made by Congress and the SEC.”); James J. Park, Two Trends in the Regulation 
of the Public Corporation, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 429, 432–34 (2012) (describing 
how securities law and state corporate law, as well as securities exchanges, regulate public company 
governance). 
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Securities fraud claims often are based on misstatements of material 
fact or omissions of material fact that make existing statements 
misleading.132 The most well-known bases for this particular cause of 
action are Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act (Section 10(b))133 and  
Rule 10b-5 adopted by the SEC under Section 10(b) (Rule 10b-5).134 
Accordingly, this Article focuses its securities regulation litigation risk 
analysis on the substantive doctrine under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 
However, it should be acknowledged that securities fraud and 
misstatement liability are also cognizable under state law and elsewhere 
under federal securities law as a component of public offering 
regulation,135 proxy regulation,136 tender offer regulation,137 and  
going-private regulation.138  The elements of these fraud and misstatement 
claims are different (including because, e.g., some claims—including 
those under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5—require proof of scienter and 
some do not), and the relief that may be sought (damages, rescission, etc.) 
varies.139 Nevertheless, the prominence of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 
litigation makes it a useful example. 
Successful securities fraud actions brought under Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 require proof by the plaintiff of three core elements 
constituting wrongful conduct, regardless of whether enforcement is 
public or private. To violate Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a defendant’s 
actions must be (1) deceptive or manipulative (including by misstating a 
material fact or omitting to state a material fact necessary to make 
disclosed information not misleading), (2) in connection with the purchase 
or sale of a security, and (3) taken with the requisite scienter.140 Proof of 
                                                     
 132. See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry et al., The Irrationality of Shareholder Class Action Lawsuits: 
A Proposal for Reform, 49 S.D. L. REV. 275, 302 (2003–2004) (“The vast majority of securities fraud 
complaints refer to misstatements made by management ‘in the regular course of business,’ including 
press releases, conversations with the media, voluntary disclosures in public speeches, and 
government-required reports.”); Billy Kloos et al., Securities Fraud, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 921, 924 
(2006) (“Material misrepresentations and omissions give rise to the most common securities fraud 
actions.”). 
 133. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012). 
 134. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016). 
 135. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77l, 77m(a)(2), 77q. 
 136. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9. 
 137. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e). 
 138. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3. 
 139. See, e.g., Edward A. Fallone, Crowdfunding and Sport: How Soon Until the Fans Own the 
Franchise?, 25 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 7, 19 (2014) (“The elements of a cause of action for securities 
fraud differ slightly from the elements of a common law fraud claim.”). 
 140. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir. 1999) (“To have 
violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5, . . . [the defendant] must have: (1) made a material 
misrepresentation or a material omission as to which he had a duty to speak, or used a fraudulent 
device; (2) with scienter; (3) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.” (citation omitted)); 
S.E.C. v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1467 (2d Cir. 1996) (“In order to establish primary 
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additional elements is required both for a successful criminal securities 
fraud action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 (including willful 
conduct), which must meet the higher “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard of evidence for criminal actions,141 and for a successful private 
civil action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 (including reliance, a loss, 
and loss causation).142 
Why might legal action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 be a 
notable litigation risk for publicly traded benefit corporations? Private 
plaintiffs may bring legal actions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for 
alleged misstatements of material fact relating to the defendant firm’s 
business. Most often, these cases are brought as class actions.143 A recent 
example of this genre of securities fraud action is In re Lululemon 
Securities Litigation, a case centering on a false and misleading statement 
about the quality of yoga pants sold by lululemon athletica inc.144 
Although the Lululemon case was dismissed (based on the plaintiffs’ 
failure to plead that the alleged statements were either false or misleading 
in any material respect) and that dismissal was affirmed on appeal, the risk 
of suit alone—as well the possibility of success, or even survival of a 
motion to dismiss—in some cases is itself a litigation risk. 
                                                     
liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5, a plaintiff is required to prove that in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security the defendant, acting with scienter, made a material misrepresentation 
(or a material omission if the defendant had a duty to speak) or used a fraudulent device.”). 
 141. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2012) (requiring willful, or in the case of a false or misleading 
statement in an application, report, or document, willful and knowing conduct); see also United States 
v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665 (1997) (“To establish a criminal violation of Rule 10b–5, the 
Government must prove that a person ‘willfully’ violated the provision.”). 
 142. See, e.g., In re Int’l Bus. Machines Corp. Sec. Litig., 163 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(“To state a cause of action under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b–5 plaintiffs must prove that IBM (1) 
made misstatements or omissions of material fact; (2) with scienter; (3) in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities; (4) upon which plaintiffs relied; and (5) that plaintiffs’ reliance was the 
proximate cause of their injury.”); Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57, 
61 (2d Cir. 1985) (“In order to state a claim for relief under section 10(b) a plaintiff must allege that, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, the defendant, acting with scienter, made a false 
material representation or omitted to disclose material information and that plaintiff’s reliance on 
defendant’s actions caused him injury.”). 
 143. See, e.g., Mark K. Harder, Getting the Federal Securities Fraud Laws Moving Again After 
Chiarella and Dirks: A Proposal for Reform, 10 J. CORP. L. 711, 728 n.185 (1985) (“Rule 10b-5 actions 
are commonly time consuming, complex, and often class actions.”). 
 144. 14 F. Supp. 3d 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 604 F. App’x 62 (2d Cir. 2015). The trial court 
adequately summarized the allegations in the complaint in this short paragraph: 
Boiled down to a summary version, lead plaintiff alleges that if only lululemon had 
someone try on its black luon yoga pants before they shipped, it would have realized they 
were sheer; similarly, if lululemon had only had someone exercise in certain athletic wear 
(enough to produce sweat), it would have realized that the colors bled. As a result, lead 
plaintiff alleges that defendants’ various statements referencing, inter alia, the high quality 
of lululemon’s products and the steps the company took to fix the quality issues were 
materially false or misleading. 
Id. at 562. 
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Litigation of this kind seems likely to strike publicly held benefit 
corporations because of the inherent difficulty the firm and its advisors 
have in accurately and completely conveying the relationship between or 
among the beneficiaries of a benefit corporation’s general or specific 
public benefit corporate purpose. Public commentary on the initial filing 
for the Laureate Education, Inc. initial public offering addresses this issue: 
[I]n a public benefit corporation, the benefit can be hard to define. 
That appears to be true in the case of Laureate. I’m not particularly 
sure what creating a “positive effect” through “offering diverse 
education programs” actually means. 
Given the vagueness here, instead of being a force for good, 
Laureate’s benefit may simply result in greenwashing, that is, use of 
a public-relations-enhancing social purpose to fritter away money 
without oversight. To be sure, a Delaware-based public benefit 
corporation is required to be audited every two years for compliance 
with its objective, and Laureate has picked B Corp as its auditor. Still, 
given the newness of this form, it is uncertain how rigorous this 
auditing is, or even can be, given the loose benefit here. 
This vagueness might be fine in a private company with only a few 
owners who can do whatever they want with their company—like 
paying Bill Clinton millions—but Laureate will be public, with 
thousands of shareholders.145 
Because the public benefit is so central to the existence and 
operations of a benefit corporation, both consumers and investors will rely 
on the public disclosures of and about it. 146  From the investor standpoint, 
disclosures on and connected to a benefit corporation’s public purpose will 
be used to price securities in what will be a new sector of the public 
securities markets. Pricing inaccuracies spark investor dissatisfaction, 
which may lead to allegations of materially false or misleading 
disclosures. Notwithstanding the likely protections of a watchdog 
marketplace,147 the risk of litigation over inaccuracies and 
misunderstandings is salient. 
A potentially significant legal digression on the extent of this 
litigation risk involves the loss causation element in private legal action.148 
                                                     
 145. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Idealism That May Leave Shareholders Wishing for 
Pragmatism, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/14/ 
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 146. See Michelle J. Stecker, Awash in a Sea of Confusion: Benefit Corporations, Social 
Enterprise, and the Fear of “Greenwashing,” 50 J. ECON. ISSUES 373, 378 (2016) (“The fear of 
corporate greenwashing is a valid concern for socially conscious consumers and investors.”). 
 147. See id. at 378–79. 
 148. See generally Robert N. Rapp, Plausible Cause: Exploring the Limits of Loss Causation in 
Pleading and Proving Market Fraud Claims Under Securities Exchange Act §10(b) and SEC Rule 
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If a shareholder’s Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim against a benefit 
corporation relates to the corporation’s underdisclosure of the weight it 
gives to shareholder financial wealth maximization in a particular context 
and the directors’ actions favoring shareholder financial wealth lead to 
higher prices for the defendant’s shares in the market, the shareholder may 
have a difficult time alleging and proving a loss and, therefore, loss 
causation.  One legal commentator argues that this risk may be inherent in 
the benefit corporation structure: 
[I]t is arguable that . . . the directors of a benefit corporation will 
follow the power—they are elected by shareholders—and will 
ultimately serve the private interests of the shareholders rather than 
some broad social good. When faced with a conflict between 
shareholder interests and social goods, directors will likely align with 
the shareholders, since only the shareholders vote for directors.149 
Public enforcement of a price-enhancing disclosure lapse would still exist 
on these facts, lest there be a concern that the lack of loss causation 
prevents enforcement action from being taken against the corporation 
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Moreover, a creative trial lawyer may 
find another way for a private civil plaintiff to remedy damages resulting 
from inaccurate disclosures. 
Loss causation issues notwithstanding, the difficulty in managing 
disclosures and investor expectations in publicly held U.S. benefit 
corporations seem likely to generate securities fraud and misstatement 
cases, including individual and class actions brought under Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5. An additional factor to consider in this context is the very 
public nature of publicly held benefit corporations and the spotlight likely 
to be focused on early adopters. Professor Hillary Sale’s work on 
“publicness”150 informs this aspect of the publicly held benefit 
corporation: “As corporations grow, the groups grow and so do their 
responsibilities. When they choose to become public corporations, they 
become subject to multiple regimes. Then, when scandals occur, public 
focus on what they are doing and the corporate governance system 
grows.”151 
                                                     
10b-5, 41 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 389 (2015) (focusing on the loss causation element in Section 10(b)/Rule 
10b-5 actions). 
 149. Callison, supra note 98, at 109. 
 150. See Hillary A. Sale, J.P. Morgan: An Anatomy of Corporate Publicness, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 
1629 (2014); Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012 (2013); Hillary A. 
Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 141 (2011) [hereinafter Sale, 
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 151. Sale, New “Public” Corporation, supra note 150, at 141. 
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The Internet, the blogosphere, and other factors in contemporary 
business life, when layered onto public company disclosure regulation, 
make public company activities easier to notice and follow. Every word of 
every public statement—including those on websites and in product 
promotions, as well as those in public filings—can easily be captured and 
analyzed by unhappy investors desiring to remedy losses through 
litigation.152 Benefit corporations in the public markets, like a shiny new 
penny, are likely to get special notice and, as a result, be subject to 
enhanced scrutiny. This attention may also increase the risk of securities 
fraud and misstatement litigation. 
III. WHAT USEFUL INFORMATION CAN WE DERIVE FROM THE EXPECTED 
UNIQUE LITIGATION RISKS ATTENDANT TO BEING A PUBLICLY HELD 
U.S. BENEFIT CORPORATION? 
The foregoing summary of the unique attributes of benefit 
corporations and distinctive aspects of the litigation risks they may bear as 
public companies highlights a number of governance, regulatory, and 
public and private enforcement issues. This Part is designed to identify and 
describe those issues. A common thread unites these observations: 
corporate purpose. 
In the benefit corporation form, the articulated corporate purpose—
a benefit purpose—plays a dominant role. The benefit purpose is identified 
in the corporation’s charter and is the focus of firm management in 
operating the firm’s business and informing others about the firm and its 
operations. The possibility of liability (for the firm and the individuals who 
manage it) necessarily becomes a concern in planning for and operating 
the benefit corporation’s business. Sensitivity to these concerns is 
heightened for publicly held benefit corporations. 
Novel managerial obligations and fiduciary duties in the benefit 
corporation form build upon, leverage, and complement the corporation’s 
benefit purpose. Benefit corporation directors and officers are required to 
conduct their corporate activities in a statutorily mandated environment 
that affords them challengingly constrained, vague, and multifaceted 
discretion to manage the firm. In this difficult organizational setting, 
however, the managers of the benefit corporation are well protected from 
liability for failing to fully comply with the governance rules applicable to 
their conduct: 
Benefit corporations are not only required to have the purpose of 
creating “general public benefit,” but they can be held accountable 
                                                     
 152. See generally id. at 137 (“[A]s reporting requirements grow and technology increases, 
information becomes more accessible, digestible, and analyzable.”). 
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by shareholders should they become derelict in that duty. In turn, the 
directors and officers of benefit corporations are legally protected 
when they consider decisions based on the interests beyond those of 
just their shareholders. Voluntarily undertaking these duties and 
obligations by becoming a benefit corporation truly embeds them in 
the institution, acting as a safeguard against any potential slackening 
of commitment over time.153 
Overall, the benefit corporation structure places pressure on the 
intersection between the corporation’s benefit purpose and managerial 
conduct. 
This structural pressure on officers and directors is not accompanied 
by meaningful state law accountability mechanisms for enforcing these 
new, distinctive management norms. Traditional state law protections for 
corporate managers are available to benefit corporation directors and 
officers, and these protections have been expanded under benefit 
corporation law—although perhaps not perfectly—to cover the new risks 
attendant to managing a benefit corporation.154 One could conclude that 
benefit corporation law provides little assurance that directors and officers 
will not defect or shirk.155 
Yet, as is true in the regulation of corporate management generally, 
market forces also are likely to play a role in assuring that benefit 
corporation directors and officers hew to the firm’s benefit purpose and 
act in accordance with their fiduciary duties: 
Corporate directors operate within a pervasive web of accountability 
mechanisms that substitute for monitoring by residual claimants. A 
variety of market forces provide important constraints. The capital 
and product markets, the internal and external employment markets, 
and the market for corporate control all constrain shirking by firm 
agents.156 
The extent to which market forces may play a role in managing the 
managers of benefit corporations depends on the health, efficiency, and 
maturity of the markets in which the firm participates. Undoubtedly, 
                                                     
 153. Shelley Alpern, When B Corp Met Wall Street, CLEAN YIELD ASSET MGMT. (Mar. 18, 
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publicly held benefit corporations will participate in markets that will 
provide helpful norms and discipline. However, owing to the central 
nature of corporate purpose in benefit corporations, they occupy a new, 
unique place in the market for business entities and will be a novel piece 
of the for-profit corporate public investment market. The ability of the 
market to discipline and correct managerial wrongdoing in publicly held 
benefit corporations is untested. 
Accordingly, it is difficult to tell whether benefit corporation law has 
struck the right balance between the board’s authority (in terms of its 
obligations and duties) and its accountability. Perhaps only time will tell. 
As one observer concluded, “Ultimately, the shareholders and others who 
are relying on the requirements of . . . any benefit corporation act must rely 
on the integrity of the board of directors—as must the shareholders of all 
corporations.”157 
This reliance is undoubtedly more comfortable for small-firm 
investors and shareholders, who are likely to know each other and the 
corporate managers better and be able to monitor the corporate managers 
more closely. In the public firm setting, however, these close relationships 
do not typically exist. Other than shareholder litigation, the main way in 
which shareholders hold public company directors accountable is by 
failing to reelect them—no small task: 
The right to elect the company’s board of directors is the primary 
control that shareholders have in furthering a material public benefit. 
This is not a novel provision unique to benefit corporation legislation; 
it is standard for traditional corporations. Shareholders are able to 
elect the directors they feel are best able to pursue a socially 
beneficial policy, which experts argue represents shareholders’ main 
means of controlling a benefit corporation. However, this right is of 
limited practical effect in providing a company’s stakeholders with 
the capability to hold directors accountable in the course of their 
duties.158 
Thus, shareholder voting power in director elections is a real, but 
likely weak, accountability tool. Its weakness may be more pronounced in 
the publicly held benefit corporation context to the extent that there is 
disagreement in the shareholder base on how to properly balance the 
various focal points of the corporation’s chartered public benefit. The 
commonly dispersed, disaggregated shareholdings of public companies 
may increase the likelihood of disagreement about the way in which the 
                                                     
 157. Herrick K. Lidstone, Jr., The Long and Winding Road to Public Benefit Corporations in 
Colorado, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2014, at 39, 44. 
 158. Nass, supra note 67, at 886 (footnotes omitted). 
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board of directors must or should weigh the various interests and 
constituencies the corporation serves in its deliberations. 
As played out in the public realm, the uncertain governance 
environment for U.S. benefit corporations may beg for more than 
shareholder enforcement mechanisms. Additional regulation at the state or 
federal level also may play a role: 
Governance is not just about relationships between officers, 
directors, and shareholders. Public companies operate in a public 
sphere, making public disclosures on a regular basis. The SEC 
dictates what, when, why, and how much they must say. Corporations 
are also subject to media and blogging. So is the SEC. These factors 
combine to increase expectations about the SEC’s role and pressure 
for the SEC to do something when things go wrong. That pressure 
shifts to corporations, their public disclosures, and their governance 
choices.159 
This cyclical relationship between the governed and the government will 
continue to evolve the rules and norms for all publicly held firms, 
including publicly held benefit corporations. This evolution is likely to 
occur both through traditional legislative and regulatory enactments and 
through selective public enforcement. 
In fact, the same factors that may catalyze government intervention 
in publicly held U.S. benefit corporations contribute to the overall risk of 
litigation against these firms. Public disclosure mandates and overall 
“publicness,” when layered onto doctrinal uncertainties in benefit 
corporation law, may resurrect—in a new context—debates waged in past 
judicial opinions relating to for-profit corporations generally. As the 
analysis in Part II indicates, these debates may include (among other 
things): the nature of a viable claim that corporate action is ultra vires and 
the extent to which that claim can be pursued;160 the classification of good 
faith claims against directors or officers as a matter of fiduciary duty 
analysis under Delaware law and the laws of other states;161 the 
applicability of the business judgment rule in the judicial review of 
decisions made and actions taken by benefit corporation directors and 
officers;162 the application of entire fairness judicial review and other 
forms of enhanced judicial scrutiny (including over antitakeover measures 
adopted by benefit corporations’ boards of directors);163 shareholder 
standing to bring derivative litigation against benefit corporation directors 
                                                     
 159. Sale, New “Public” Corporation, supra note 150, at 144. 
 160. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra notes 99–111 and accompanying text. 
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or officers;164 and the elements of a misstatement or omission claim under 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.165 
Moreover, benefit corporation law brings with it new doctrine that 
will be independently scrutinized in the wake of shareholder or investor 
dissatisfaction. Benefit corporation incorporation (including, crucially, the 
required corporate purpose clauses) and benefit report filings, benefit 
enforcement proceedings, and other novel aspects of benefit corporation 
law not addressed in this Article invite, and are likely to require, judicial 
interpretation (and possible legislative adjustment). For example, given 
that even a limited review of incorporation filings reveals a number of 
erroneous filings166 and that compliance with benefit report filing 
requirements similarly appears to be wanting,167 enforcement action may 
be anticipated. One also might anticipate litigation battles over the 
availability of benefit enforcement proceedings.168 
The distinctive features of the benefit corporation form, taken 
together with key attendant litigation risks for publicly held U.S. benefit 
corporations identified in this Article, confirm and underscore the key role 
that corporate purpose plays in benefit corporation law. A benefit 
corporation’s corporate purpose underlies in some way each of the traits 
and risks identified. Undoubtedly, observations beyond those included 
here can be made on the governance, regulatory, and enforcement issues 
involving publicly held U.S. benefit corporations. Even if additional 
observations are made, however, the central position of the benefit purpose 
is likely to loom large. 
The information, analysis, and observations supplied in this Article 
have salience for government officials, policymakers, benefit corporation 
management, legal advisors of corporations, and academic observers, 
among others. Specifically, reflections on the substance of this Article 
may: 
 help secretaries of state identify, and instigate them to address, 
compliance problems in benefit corporation filings, especially in 
charter documents; 
 inspire promoters of benefit corporation legislation, members of 
the corporate bar, and legislators to inquire deeply into the 
existing state law relating to ultra vires actions and director and 
officer fiduciary duties before recommending the adoption of 
benefit corporation legislation in that state; 
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 increase the attention of drafters of model benefit corporation 
legislation and individual state benefit corporation statutes to, 
among other things, the formulation of the statutory public 
benefit requirement, exculpation authorization, and requirements 
for and restrictions on private enforcement actions (e.g., benefit 
enforcement proceedings and shareholder derivative litigation); 
 prompt state legislators and members of the corporate bar to 
review existing benefit corporation statutes on a regular basis 
and suggest changes that decrease doctrinal uncertainty and 
increase predictability in interpretation and application; 
 encourage directors and officers of benefit corporations to work 
with corporate counsel to create checklists for routine 
management and common transactional decision-making that 
incorporate focused, state-of-the-art legal analysis and evolving 
best practices borrowed from analogous areas of for-profit and 
not-for-profit corporate law; 
 offer new considerations and perspectives to benefit corporation 
management and legal counsel relevant to the choice of whether 
to take a benefit corporation public; 
 enhance the attentiveness of benefit corporation directors, 
officers, and legal counsel to the accuracy and completeness of 
public disclosures (especially to avoid overclaiming or otherwise 
misrepresenting the firm’s public benefit purpose); and 
 stimulate additional research into unsettled questions under 
corporate or securities law addressed or referenced in the 
preceding pages or otherwise relevant to benefit corporations. 
 
If this Article causes any of these things to occur as the prospect of publicly 
held benefit corporations becomes increasingly likely—or even if the 
Article merely prompts additional questions about corporate purpose that 
various constituencies may ask—it will have succeeded in its mission. 
CONCLUSION 
Benefit corporations may or may not be a necessary or desirable tool 
in the U.S. entity law toolbox. Regardless, benefit corporation legislation 
has been widely adopted, businesses are incorporating under those 
legislative enactments, and a few among the resultant benefit corporations 
are poised to enter the public securities markets. As a result, it is important 
to better understand the unique attributes of benefit corporation law as a 
component of corporate law and to begin to anticipate the associated 
litigation risk publicly held U.S. benefit corporations may face. This 
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Article undertakes to make progress in addressing these objectives with 
the hope that subsequent work will further engage them. 
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APPENDIX 1: SUMMARY OF PUBLIC BENEFIT PROVISIONS IN STATE 
BENEFIT CORPORATION STATUTES (CURRENT AS OF MARCH 2016) 
State General Benefit 
Required 
Specific Benefit 
Required 
Specific Benefit 
Optional 
Arizona X  X 
Arkansas X  X 
California X  X 
Colorado   X a   
Connecticut X  X 
Delaware   X a   
Florida X  X 
Hawaii X  X 
Idaho X  X 
Illinois X  X 
Indiana X  X 
Louisiana X  X 
Maryland X  X 
Massachusetts X  X 
Minnesota X b  X c  
Montana X  X 
Nebraska X  X 
Nevada X  X 
New Hampshire X  X 
New Jersey X  X 
New York X  X 
Oregon X  X 
Pennsylvania X  X 
Rhode Island X  X 
South Carolina X  X 
Tennessee X d   
Utah X  X 
Vermont X  X 
Virginia X  X 
West Virginia X  X 
Washington, D.C. X  X 
a  at least one 
b  if incorporated as a general benefit 
corporation 
c  if incorporated as a specific benefit 
corporation 
d  at least one public benefit required  
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APPENDIX 2: PUBLIC BENEFIT DEFINITIONS IN STATE BENEFIT 
CORPORATION STATUTES (CURRENT AS OF MARCH 2016) 
 
State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
Arizona 
 
ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. § 10-2402 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material positive 
impact on society and the 
environment, taken as a 
whole, assessed against a 
third-party standard, from 
the business and operations 
of a benefit corporation. 
 
“Specific public benefit” 
includes: 
(a) Providing low-income 
or underserved individuals 
or communities with 
beneficial products or 
services. 
(b) Promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business. 
(c) Protecting or restoring 
the environment. 
(d) Improving human 
health. 
(e) Promoting the arts, 
sciences or advancement of 
knowledge. 
(f) Increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
purpose to benefit society 
or the environment. 
(g) Conferring any other 
particular benefit on 
society or the environment 
as specified in the benefit 
corporation's articles of 
incorporation. 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
Arkansas 
 
ARK. CODE § 4-
36-103 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material positive 
impact on society and the 
environment, taken as a 
whole, assessed against a 
third-party standard, from 
the business and operations 
of a benefit corporation; 
 
“Specific public benefit” 
means: 
(A) Providing low-income 
or underserved individuals 
or communities with 
beneficial products or 
services; 
(B) Promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business; 
(C) Preserving the 
environment; 
(D) Improving human 
health; 
(E) Promoting the arts, 
sciences, or advancement 
of knowledge; 
(F) Increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
public benefit purpose; and 
(G) Conferring any other 
particular benefit on 
society or the environment. 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
California 
 
CAL. CORP. 
CODE § 14601 
 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material positive 
impact on society and the 
environment, taken as a 
whole, as assessed against 
a third-party standard, from 
the business and operations 
of a benefit corporation. 
 
“Specific public benefit” 
includes all of the 
following: 
(1) Providing low-income 
or underserved individuals 
or communities with 
beneficial products or 
services. 
(2) Promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
ordinary course of 
business. 
(3) Preserving the 
environment. 
(4) Improving human 
health. 
(5) Promoting the arts, 
sciences, or advancement 
of knowledge. 
(6) Increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
public benefit purpose. 
(7) The accomplishment of 
any other particular benefit 
for society or the 
environment. 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
Colorado 
 
COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 7-
101-503  
 
 
“Public benefit” means one 
or more positive effects or 
reduction of negative 
effects on one or more 
categories of persons, 
entities, communities, or 
interests other than 
shareholders in their 
capacities as shareholders, 
including effects of an 
artistic, charitable, cultural, 
economic, educational, 
environmental, literary, 
medical, religious, 
scientific, or technological 
nature. 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
Connecticut 
 
CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 
33-1351  
 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material positive 
impact on both society and 
the environment, taken as a 
whole, as assessed against 
a third-party standard, from 
the business and operations 
of a benefit corporation. 
 
“Specific public benefit” 
includes:  
(A) Providing low-income 
or underserved individuals 
or communities with 
beneficial products or 
services;  
(B) promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business; 
(C) protecting or restoring 
the environment;  
(D) improving human 
health;  
(E) promoting the arts, 
sciences or advancement of 
knowledge;  
(F) increasing the flow of 
capital to other benefit 
corporations or similar 
entities whose purpose is to 
benefit society or the 
environment; and  
(G) conferring any other 
particular benefit on 
society or the environment. 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
Delaware 
 
DEL. CODE ANN. 
TIT. 8, § 362 
 
 
“Public benefit” means a 
positive effect (or 
reduction of negative 
effects) on 1 or more 
categories of persons, 
entities, communities or 
interests (other than 
stockholders in their 
capacities as stockholders) 
including, but not limited 
to, effects of an artistic, 
charitable, cultural, 
economic, educational, 
environmental, literary, 
medical, religious, 
scientific or technological 
nature.  
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
Florida 
 
FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 607.602 
 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material, positive 
effect on society and the 
environment, taken as a 
whole, as assessed using a 
third-party standard which 
is attributable to the 
business and operations of 
a benefit corporation. 
 
“Specific public benefit” 
includes, but is not limited 
to: 
(a) Providing low-income 
or underserved individuals 
or communities with 
beneficial products or 
services; 
(b) Promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business; 
(c) Protecting or restoring 
the environment; 
(d) Improving human 
health; 
(e) Promoting the arts, 
sciences, or advancement 
of knowledge; 
(f) Increasing the flow of 
capital to entities that have 
as their stated purpose the 
provision of a benefit to 
society or the environment; 
and 
(g) Any other public 
benefit consistent with the 
purposes of the benefit 
corporation. 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
Hawaii 
 
HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 
420D-2  
 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material positive 
impact on society and the 
environment, taken as a 
whole and as measured by 
a third-party standard 
under section 420D-12, 
from the business and 
operations of a sustainable 
business corporation. 
 
 
Idaho 
 
IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 30-2002 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material positive 
impact on society and the 
environment, taken as a 
whole, as assessed under a 
third-party standard, 
resulting from the business 
and operations of a benefit 
corporation. 
 
“Specific public benefit” 
includes: 
(a) Providing low-income 
or underserved individuals 
or communities with 
beneficial products or 
services; 
(b) Promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business; 
(c) Protecting or restoring 
the environment; 
(d) Improving human 
health; 
(e) Promoting the arts, 
sciences or advancement of 
knowledge; 
(f) Increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
purpose to benefit society 
or the environment; or 
(g) Conferring any other 
particular benefit on 
society or the environment. 
2017] Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk  661 
State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
Illinois 
 
805 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 
40/1.10 
 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material positive 
impact on society and the 
environment, taken as a 
whole, assessed against a 
third-party standard, from 
the business and operations 
of a benefit corporation. 
 
“Specific public benefit” 
means: 
(1) providing low-income 
or underserved individuals 
or communities with 
beneficial products or 
services; 
(2) promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
ordinary course of 
business; 
(3) preserving the 
environment; 
(4) improving human 
health; 
(5) promoting the arts, 
sciences or advancement of 
knowledge; 
(6) increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
public benefit purpose; or 
(7) the accomplishment of 
any other particular benefit 
for society or the 
environment. 
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Indiana 
 
IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 23-1.3-2-7 
 
& 
 
IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 23-1.3-2-10 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material positive 
impact on society and the 
environment, taken as a 
whole, assessed against a 
third party standard, from 
the business and operations 
of a benefit corporation. 
 
(a) “Specific public 
benefit” means a benefit 
that serves: 
(1) one (1) or more public 
welfare, religious, 
charitable, scientific, 
literary, or educational 
purposes; or 
(2) other purposes or 
benefits beyond the strict 
interests of the 
shareholders of the benefit 
corporation. 
(b) The term includes the 
following: 
(1) Providing low income 
or underserved individuals 
or communities with 
beneficial products or 
services. 
(2) Promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business. 
(3) Protecting or restoring 
the environment. 
(4) Improving human 
health. 
(5) Promoting the arts, 
sciences, or advancement 
of knowledge. 
(6) Increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
purpose to benefit society 
or the environment. 
(7) Conferring any other 
particular benefit on 
society or the environment. 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
Louisiana 
 
 
LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 12:1803 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material positive 
impact on society and the 
environment, taken as a 
whole, assessed against a 
third-party standard, from 
the business and operations 
of a benefit corporation. 
 
“Specific public benefit” 
means any of the 
following: 
(a) Serving low-income or 
underserved individuals or 
communities. 
(b) Promoting economic 
opportunity for low-
income or underserved 
individuals or 
communities. 
(c) Preserving the 
environment, promoting 
positive impacts on the 
environment, or reducing 
negative impacts on the 
environment. 
(d) Improving human 
health. 
(e) Promoting the arts, 
sciences, or advancement 
of knowledge. 
(f) Increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
purpose listed in this 
Paragraph. 
(g) Historic preservation. 
(h) Urban beautification. 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
Maryland 
 
 
MD. CODE ANN., 
CORPS. & ASS'NS 
§ 5-6C-01 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material, positive 
impact on society and the 
environment, as measured 
by a third-party standard, 
through activities that 
promote a combination of 
specific public benefits. 
 
“Specific public benefit” 
includes: 
(1) Providing individuals 
or communities with 
beneficial products or 
services; 
(2) Promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business; 
(3) Preserving the 
environment; 
(4) Improving human 
health; 
(5) Promoting the arts, 
sciences, or advancement 
of knowledge; 
(6) Increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
public benefit purpose; or 
(7) The accomplishment of 
any other particular benefit 
for society or the 
environment. 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
Massachusetts 
 
 
MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. CH. 
156E, § 2 
 
“General public benefit”, a 
material, positive impact 
on society and the 
environment, taken as a 
whole, as measured by a 
third-party standard, from 
the business and operations 
of a benefit corporation. 
 
“Specific public benefit”, 
any of the following:  
(1) providing low-income 
or underserved individuals 
or communities with 
beneficial products or 
services;  
(2) promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business; 
(3) promoting the 
preservation and 
conservation of the 
environment;  
(4) improving human 
health;  
(5) promoting the arts, 
sciences, access to and 
advancement of 
knowledge;  
(6) increasing or 
facilitating the flow of 
capital and assets to 
entities with a general 
public benefit purpose; or 
(7) conferring any other 
particular benefit on 
society or the environment. 
666 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:611 
State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
Minnesota 
 
MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 
304A.021 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a net material 
positive impact from the 
business and operations of 
a general benefit 
corporation on society, the 
environment, and the well-
being of present and future 
generations. 
 
“Specific public benefit” 
means one or more positive 
impacts, or reduction of a 
negative impact, on 
specified categories of 
natural persons, entities, 
communities, or interests, 
other than shareholders in 
their capacity as 
shareholders, as 
enumerated in the articles 
of a public benefit 
corporation. 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
Montana 
 
MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 35-1-
1402 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material, positive 
impact on society and the 
environment, taken as a 
whole, as assessed against 
a third-party standard, from 
the business and operations 
of a benefit corporation. 
 
“Specific public benefit” 
means: 
(a) providing low-income 
or underserved individuals 
or communities with 
beneficial products or 
services; 
(b) promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
ordinary course of 
business; 
(c) preserving the 
environment; 
(d) improving human 
health; 
(e) promoting the arts, 
sciences, or advancement 
of knowledge; 
(f) increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
public benefit purpose; or 
(g) the accomplishment of 
any other particular benefit 
for society or the 
environment. 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
Nebraska 
 
NEB. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-403 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material positive 
impact on society and the 
environment, taken as a 
whole, assessed against a 
third-party standard, from 
the business and operations 
of a benefit corporation[.] 
 
“Specific public benefit” 
includes: 
(a) Providing low-income 
or underserved individuals 
or communities with 
beneficial products or 
services; 
(b) Promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business; 
(c) Protecting or restoring 
the environment; 
(d) Improving human 
health; 
(e) Promoting the arts, 
sciences, or advancement 
of knowledge; 
(f) Increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
purpose to benefit society 
or the environment; and 
(g) Conferring any other 
particular benefit on 
society or the 
environment[.] 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
Nevada 
 
NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 78B.040 
 
& 
 
NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 78B.060 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material positive 
impact on society and the 
environment, taken as a 
whole, as assessed against 
a third-party standard, from 
the business and operations 
of a benefit corporation. 
 
“Specific public benefit” 
includes, without 
limitation: 
1. Providing low-income or 
underserved individuals or 
communities with 
beneficial products or 
services; 
2. Promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business; 
3. Protecting, preserving or 
restoring the environment; 
4. Improving human 
health; 
5. Promoting the arts, 
sciences or advancement of 
knowledge; 
6. Increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
general public benefit 
purpose; and 
7. The accomplishment of 
any other particular benefit 
for society or the 
environment. 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
New Hampshire 
 
N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 293-C:2 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material positive 
effect on society and the 
environment, taken as a 
whole, assessed against a 
third-party standard, from 
the business and operations 
of a benefit corporation. 
 
“Specific public benefit” 
includes: 
(a) Providing low-income 
or underserved individuals 
or communities with 
beneficial products or 
services; 
(b) Promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business; 
(c) Protecting or restoring 
the environment; 
(d) Improving human 
health; 
(e) Promoting the arts, 
sciences, or advancement 
of knowledge; 
(f) Increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
purpose to benefit society 
or the environment; and 
(g) Conferring any other 
particular benefit on 
society or the environment. 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
New Jersey 
 
N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14A:18-1 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material positive 
impact on society and the 
environment by the 
operations of a benefit 
corporation through 
activities that promote 
some combination of 
specific public benefits. 
 
“Specific public benefit” 
includes: 
(1) Providing low-income 
individuals or communities 
with beneficial products or 
services; 
(2) Promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business; 
(3) Preserving the 
environment; 
(4) Improving human 
health; 
(5) Promoting the arts, 
sciences or advancement of 
knowledge; 
(6) Increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
public benefit purpose; and 
(7) The accomplishment of 
any other particular benefit 
for society or the 
environment. 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
New York 
 
N.Y. BUS. CORP. 
LAW § 1702 
(McKinney) 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material positive 
impact on society and the 
environment, taken as a 
whole, assessed against a 
third-party standard, from 
the business and operations 
of a benefit corporation. 
 
“Specific public benefit,” 
includes: 
(1) providing low-income 
or underserved individuals 
or communities with 
beneficial products or 
services; 
(2) promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business; 
(3) preserving the 
environment; 
(4) improving human 
health; 
(5) promoting the arts, 
sciences or advancement of 
knowledge; 
(6) increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
public benefit purpose; and 
(7) the accomplishment of 
any other particular benefit 
for society or the 
environment. 
 
Oregon 
 
OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 60.750 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material positive 
impact on society and the 
environment, taken as a 
whole, from the business 
and operations of a benefit 
company. 
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Pennsylvania 
 
15 PA. STAT. 
AND CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 
3302 
“General public benefit.” A 
material positive impact on 
society and the 
environment, taken as a 
whole and assessed against 
a third-party standard, from 
the business and operations 
of a benefit corporation. 
“Specific public benefit.” 
Includes: 
(1) providing low-income 
or underserved individuals 
or communities with 
beneficial products or 
services; 
(2) promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business; 
(3) preserving the 
environment; 
(4) improving human 
health; 
(5) promoting the arts, 
sciences or advancement of 
knowledge; 
(6) promoting economic 
development through 
support of initiatives that 
increase access to capital 
for emerging and growing 
technology enterprises, 
facilitate the transfer and 
commercial adoption of 
new technologies, provide 
technical and business 
support to emerging and 
growing technology 
enterprises or form support 
partnerships that support 
those objectives; 
(7) increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
public benefit purpose; and 
(8) the accomplishment of 
any other particular benefit 
for society or the 
environment. 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
Rhode Island 
 
7 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. § 7-
5.3-2 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material positive 
impact on society and the 
environment, taken as a 
whole, assessed against a 
third-party standard, from 
the business and operations 
of a benefit corporation. 
 
“Specific public benefit” 
includes: 
(i) Providing low-income 
or underserved individuals 
or communities with 
beneficial products or 
services; 
(ii) Promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business; 
(iii) Protecting or restoring 
the environment; 
(iv) Improving human 
health; 
(v) Promoting the arts, 
sciences, or advancement 
of knowledge; 
(vi) Increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
purpose to benefit society 
or the environment; and 
(vii) Conferring any other 
particular benefit on 
society or the environment. 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
South Carolina 
 
S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 33-38-130 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material positive 
impact on society and the 
environment taken as a 
whole, as assessed against 
a third-party standard, from 
the business and operations 
of a benefit corporation. 
 
“Specific public benefit 
purpose” means a benefit 
that serves one or more 
public welfare, religious, 
charitable, scientific, 
literary, or educational 
purposes, or other purposes 
or benefits beyond the 
strict interest of the 
shareholders of the benefit 
corporation, including: 
(a) providing low-income 
or underserved individuals, 
families, or communities 
with beneficial products, 
services, or educational 
opportunities; 
(b) promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business; 
(c) preserving or 
improving the 
environment; 
(d) improving human 
health; 
(e) promoting the arts, 
sciences, or advancement 
of knowledge; 
(f) increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
public benefit purpose; or 
(g) conferring any other 
particular benefit on 
society and the 
environment. 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
Tennessee 
 
TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 48-28-
103 
 
“Public benefit” means a 
positive effect or reduction 
of negative effects on one 
(1) or more categories of 
persons, entities, 
communities, or interests, 
other than shareholders in 
their capacities as 
shareholders, including, 
but not limited to, an 
artistic, charitable, cultural, 
economic, educational, 
environmental, literary, 
medical, religious, 
scientific, or technological 
effect[.] 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
Utah 
 
UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 16-10b-
103 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material positive 
impact on society and the 
environment: 
(a) taken as a whole; 
(b) assessed against a third-
party standard; and 
(c) from the business of a 
benefit corporation. 
 
“Specific public benefit” 
includes: 
(a) providing low-income 
or underserved individuals 
or communities with 
beneficial products or 
services; 
(b) promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business; 
(c) protecting or restoring 
the environment; 
(d) improving human 
health; 
(e) promoting the arts, 
sciences, or advancement 
of knowledge; 
(f) increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
purpose to benefit society 
or the environment; and 
(g) conferring any other 
particular benefit on 
society or the environment. 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
Vermont 
 
VT. STAT. ANN. 
TIT. 11A, § 21.03 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material positive 
impact on society and the 
environment, as measured 
by a third-party standard, 
through activities that 
promote some combination 
of specific public benefits. 
 
“Specific public benefit” 
includes: 
(A) providing low income 
or underserved individuals 
or communities with 
beneficial products or 
services; 
(B) promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business; 
(C) preserving or 
improving the 
environment; 
(D) improving human 
health; 
(E) promoting the arts or 
sciences or the 
advancement of 
knowledge; 
(F) increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
public benefit purpose; and 
(G) the accomplishment of 
any other identifiable 
benefit for society or the 
environment. 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
Virginia 
 
VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 13.1-782 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material positive 
impact on society and the 
environment taken as a 
whole, as measured by a 
third-party standard, from 
the business and operations 
of a benefit corporation. 
 
“Specific public benefit” 
means a benefit that serves 
one or more public 
welfare, religious, 
charitable, scientific, 
literary, or educational 
purposes, or other purpose 
or benefit beyond the strict 
interest of the shareholders 
of the benefit corporation, 
including: 
1. Providing low-income or 
underserved individuals or 
communities with 
beneficial products or 
services; 
2. Promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business; 
3. Preserving or improving 
the environment; 
4. Improving human 
health; 
5. Promoting the arts, 
sciences, or advancement 
of knowledge; 
6. Increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
public benefit purpose; and 
7. Conferring any other 
particular benefit on 
society or the environment. 
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Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
West Virginia 
 
W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 31F-1-
102 
 
“General public benefit” 
means a material positive 
impact on society and the 
environment taken as a 
whole, as measured by a 
third-party standard, from 
the business and operations 
of a benefit corporation. 
 
“Specific public benefit” 
means a benefit that serves 
one or more public 
welfare, religious, 
charitable, scientific, 
literary or educational 
purposes, or other purpose 
or benefit beyond the strict 
interest of the shareholders 
of the benefit corporation, 
including: 
(1) Providing low-income 
or underserved individuals 
or communities with 
beneficial products or 
services; 
(2) Promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business; 
(3) Preserving or 
improving the 
environment; 
(4) Improving human 
health; 
(5) Promoting the arts, 
sciences or advancement of 
knowledge; 
(6) Increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
public benefit purpose; and 
(7) Conferring any other 
particular benefit on 
society or the environment. 
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State and  
Statutory  
Reference 
General Public Benefit 
Definition 
Specific Public Benefit 
Definition 
 
Washington, 
D.C. 
 
D.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 29-1301.02 
 
“General public benefit” 
means the material positive 
impact that the business 
and operations of a benefit 
corporation has on society 
and the environment, taken 
as a whole, assessed 
against a third-party 
standard. 
 
“Specific public benefit” 
includes: 
(A) Providing low-income 
or underserved individuals 
or communities with 
beneficial products or 
services; 
(B) Promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals 
or communities beyond the 
creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business; 
(C) Preserving the 
environment; 
(D) Improving human 
health; 
(E) Promoting the arts, 
sciences, or advancement 
of knowledge; 
(F) Increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a 
public benefit purpose; and 
(G) The accomplishment 
of any other particular 
benefit on society or the 
environment. 
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APPENDIX 3: SUMMARY OF BENEFIT CORPORATION DIRECTOR AND 
OFFICER PROVISIONS IN STATE BENEFIT CORPORATION STATUTES 
(CURRENT AS OF MARCH 2016) 
State Director 
Required 
Director 
Optional 
Depends on 
Public 
Company 
Status 
Officer 
Optional 
No Benefit 
Director/ 
Officer 
Statute 
Arizona  X  X  
Arkansas     X 
California     X 
Colorado     X 
Connecticut X   X  
Delaware     X 
Florida  X  X  
Hawaii X   X  
Idaho   X X  
Illinois X   X  
Indiana X   X  
Louisiana X   X  
Maryland     X 
Massachusetts X   X  
Minnesota     X 
Montana     X 
Nebraska   X X  
Nevada     X 
New Hampshire   X X  
New Jersey X   X  
New York     X 
Oregon  X    
Pennsylvania   X X  
Rhode Island   X X  
South Carolina X   X  
Tennessee     X 
Utah   X X  
Vermont     X a X  
Virginia     X 
West Virginia     X 
Washington D.C. X   X  
a optional for close corporations 
 
